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We propose a framework and methodology for quantifying the effect of denial of service (DoS) attacks on a distributed system. We present a systematic study of the resistance of gossip-based multicast protocols to DoS attacks. We show that even distributed and randomized gossip-based protocols, which eliminate single points of failure, do not necessarily eliminate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. We propose Drum—a simple gossip-based multicast protocol that eliminates such vulnerabilities. Drum was implemented in Java and tested on a large cluster. We show, using closed-form mathematical analysis, simulations, and empirical tests, that Drum survives severe DoS attacks.
Distributed applications, reliability, availability, and serviceability, distributed programming.

G. Badishi, I. Keidar and A. Sasson, "Exposing and Eliminating Vulnerabilities to Denial of Service Attacks in Secure Gossip-Based Multicast," in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 3, no. , pp. 45-61, 2006.
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