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Issue No. 01 - January-March (2004 vol. 1)
ISSN: 1545-5971
pp: 48-65
The development of techniques for quantitative, model-based evaluation of computer system dependability has a long and rich history. A wide array of model-based evaluation techniques is now available, ranging from combinatorial methods, which are useful for quick, rough-cut analyses, to state-based methods, such as Markov reward models, and detailed, discrete-event simulation. The use of quantitative techniques for security evaluation is much less common, and has typically taken the form of formal analysis of small parts of an overall design, or experimental red team-based approaches. Alone, neither of these approaches is fully satisfactory, and we argue that there is much to be gained through the development of a sound model-based methodology for quantifying the security one can expect from a particular design. In this work, we survey existing model-based techniques for evaluating system dependability, and summarize how they are now being extended to evaluate system security. We find that many techniques from dependability evaluation can be applied in the security domain, but that significant challenges remain, largely due to fundamental differences between the accidental nature of the faults commonly assumed in dependability evaluation, and the intentional, human nature of cyber attacks.
Dependability evaluation, security evaluation, performability evaluation, stochastic modeling.

W. H. Sanders, D. M. Nicol and K. S. Trivedi, "Model-Based Evaluation: From Dependability to Security," in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 1, no. , pp. 48-65, 2004.
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