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Issue No. 09 - Sept. (2013 vol. 12)
ISSN: 1536-1233
pp: 1697-1711
Dan Xu , University of California, Davis, Davis
Xin Liu , University of California, Davis, Davis
Zhu Han , University of Houston, Houston
Market mechanisms have been exploited as important means for spectrum acquisition and access in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we propose a two-tier market for decentralized dynamic spectrum access. In the proposed Tier-1 market, spectrum is traded from a primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs) in a relatively large time scale to reduce signaling overhead. Then, driven by dynamic traffic demands, SUs set up the Tier-2 market to redistribute channels among themselves in a small time scale. More specifically, we use a Nash bargain game to model the spectrum acquisition of SUs in the Tier-1 market and derive the equilibrium prices. We then employ a strategic bargain game to study the spectrum redistribution in the Tier-2 market, where SUs can exchange channels with low overhead through random matching, bilateral bargain, and the predetermined market equilibrium price. We investigate how various factors, such as the availability of channels and bargain partners, matching strategies, and traffic dynamics, affect the market relationships. This work provides new understanding on the spectrum market and valuable guidelines to primary and secondary network operators.
Games, Contracts, TV, Mobile computing, Equations, Mathematical model, Wireless networks, strategic bargain game, Dynamic spectrum access, spectrum market, distributed bargain, Nash bargain game

X. Liu, Z. Han and D. Xu, "Decentralized Bargain: A Two-Tier Market for Efficient and Flexible Dynamic Spectrum Access," in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. , pp. 1697-1711, 2013.
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