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Issue No.11 - Nov. (2012 vol.11)
pp: 1706-1719
Lingjie Duan , The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Jianwei Huang , City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Biying Shou , City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two competitive secondary operators' investment (i.e., spectrum leasing) and pricing strategies, taking into account operators' heterogeneity in leasing costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission power and channel conditions. We model the interactions between operators and users as a three-stage dynamic game, where operators simultaneously make spectrum leasing decisions in Stage I, and pricing decisions in Stage II, and then users make purchase decisions in Stage III. Using backward induction, we are able to completely characterize the dynamic game's equilibria. We show that both operators' investment and pricing equilibrium decisions process interesting threshold properties. For example, when the two operators' leasing costs are close, both operators will lease positive spectrum. Otherwise, one operator will choose not to lease and the other operator becomes the monopolist. For pricing, a positive pure strategy equilibrium exists only when the total spectrum investment of both operators is less than a threshold. Moreover, two operators always choose the same equilibrium price despite their heterogeneity in leasing costs. Each user fairly achieves the same service quality in terms of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the equilibrium, and the obtained predictable payoff is linear in its transmission power and channel gain. We also compare the duopoly equilibrium with the coordinated case where two operators cooperate to maximize their total profit. We show that the maximum loss of total profit due to operators' competition is no larger than 25 percent. The users, however, always benefit from operators' competition in terms of their payoffs. We show that most of these insights are robust in the general SNR regime.
Pricing, Bandwidth, Investments, Wireless communication, Signal to noise ratio, Games, Bismuth, subgame perfect equilibrium, Cognitive radio, spectrum trading, dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum pricing, multistage dynamic game
Lingjie Duan, Jianwei Huang, Biying Shou, "Duopoly Competition in Dynamic Spectrum Leasing and Pricing", IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.11, no. 11, pp. 1706-1719, Nov. 2012, doi:10.1109/TMC.2011.213
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