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Issue No. 08 - Aug. (2012 vol. 11)
ISSN: 1536-1233
pp: 1287-1303
Haiying Shen , Clemson University, Clemson
Ze Li , Clemson University, Clemson
In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), tasks are conducted based on the cooperation of nodes in the networks. However, since the nodes are usually constrained by limited computation resources, selfish nodes may refuse to be cooperative. Reputation systems and price-based systems are two main solutions to the node noncooperation problem. A reputation system evaluates node behaviors by reputation values and uses a reputation threshold to distinguish trustworthy nodes and untrustworthy nodes. A price-based system uses virtual cash to control the transactions of a packet forwarding service. Although these two kinds of systems have been widely used, very little research has been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of the node cooperation incentives provided by the systems. In this paper, we use game theory to analyze the cooperation incentives provided by these two systems and by a system with no cooperation incentive strategy. We find that the strategies of using a threshold to determine the trustworthiness of a node in the reputation system and of rewarding cooperative nodes in the price-based system may be manipulated by clever or wealthy but selfish nodes. Illumined by the investigation results, we propose and study an integrated system. Theoretical and simulation results show the superiority of the integrated system over an individual reputation system and a price-based system in terms of the effectiveness of cooperation incentives and selfish node detection.
Mobile ad hoc networks, Game theory, Ad hoc networks, Peer to peer computing, Routing protocols, Mathematical model, game theory., MANET, distributed network, reputation system, price-based system

H. Shen and Z. Li, "Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Incentive Strategies in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 11, no. , pp. 1287-1303, 2012.
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