The Community for Technology Leaders
RSS Icon
Issue No.09 - September (2010 vol.9)
pp: 1242-1254
Zhu Ji , Qualcomm Incorporated, San Diego
Wei Yu , Microsoft Corporation, Redmond
K.J. Ray Liu , University of Maryland, College Park
In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) where each user is its own authority, the issue of cooperation enforcement must be solved first to enable networking functionalities such as packet forwarding, which becomes very difficult under noisy and imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we consider cooperation enforcement in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under noisy and imperfect observation and study the basic packet forwarding among users through the repeated game models with imperfect information. A belief evaluation framework is proposed to obtain cooperation-enforcement packet forwarding strategies only based on each node's private information including its own past actions and imperfect observation of other nodes' information. More importantly, we not only show that the proposed strategy with belief system can maintain the cooperation paradigm but also establish its performance bounds. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed belief evaluation framework can enforce the cooperation with only a small performance degradation compared with the unconditionally cooperative outcomes when noisy and imperfect observation exist.
Belief evaluation, MANETs, cooperation enforcement, game theory.
Zhu Ji, Wei Yu, K.J. Ray Liu, "A Belief Evaluation Framework in Autonomous MANETs under Noisy and Imperfect Observation: Vulnerability Analysis and Cooperation Enforcement", IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.9, no. 9, pp. 1242-1254, September 2010, doi:10.1109/TMC.2010.87
[1] C. Perkins, Ad Hoc Networking. Addison-Wesley, 2000.
[2] C.K. Toh, Ad Hoc Mobile Wireless Networks: Protocols and Systems. Prentice Hall PTR, 2001.
[3] S. Marti, T.J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, "Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks" Proc. ACM MobiCom, pp. 255-265, Aug. 2000.
[4] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, "CORE: A Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," Proc. IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conf. Comm. and Multimedia Security, 2002.
[5] S. Buchegger and J.-Y.L. Boudec, "Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol," Proc. ACM MobiHoc, pp. 226-236, 2002.
[6] S. Zhong, J. Chen, and Y.R. Yang, "Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-Based System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2003.
[7] W. Yu and K.J.R. Liu, "Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation in Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm., special issue in autonomic comm. systems, vol. 23, no. 12, pp. 2260-2271, Dec. 2005.
[8] Z. Ji, W. Yu, and K.J.R. Liu, "An Optimal Dynamic Pricing Framework for Autonomous Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2006.
[9] V. Srinivasan, P. Nuggehalli, C.F. Chiasserini, and R.R. Rao, "Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2003.
[10] Z. Ji, W. Yu, and K.J.R. Liu, "Cooperation Enforcement in Autonomous MANETs under Noise and Imperfect Observation," Proc. Third Ann. IEEE Comm. Soc. Conf. Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Comm. and Networks (SECON '06), 2006.
[11] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, "A Game Theoretical Approach to Evaluate Cooperation Enforcement Mechanisms in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," Proc. IEEE/ACM Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOPT '03) 2003.
[12] E. Altman, A.A. Kherani, P. Michiardi, and R. Molva, "Non-Cooperative Forwarding in Ad-Hoc Networks," Proc. 15th IEEE Int'l Symp. Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Comm. (PIMRC '04), 2004.
[13] S. Ganeriwal and M.B. Srivastava, "Reputation-Based Framework for High Integrity Sensor Networks," Proc. Second ACM Workshop Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN '04), Oct. 2004.
[14] F. Li and J. Wu, "Mobility Reduces Uncertainty in MANETs," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, May 2007.
[15] Y. Sun, W. Yu, Z. Han, and K.J.R. Liu, "Information Theoretic Framework of Trust Modeling and Evaluation for Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE J. Selected Areas in Comm., special issue on security in wireless ad hoc networks, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 305-317, Feb. 2006.
[16] Y. Sun, Z. Han, W. Yu, and K.J.R. Liu, "A Trust Evaluation Framework in Distributed Networks: Vulnerability Analysis and Defense Against Attacks," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2006.
[17] M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
[18] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[19] D. Abreu, P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce, "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, vol. 58, pp. 1041-1063, 1990.
[20] T. Sekiguchi, "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," J. Economic Theory, vol. 76, pp. 345-361, 1997.
[21] V. Bhaskar and I. Obara, "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," J. Economic Theory, vol. 102, pp. 40-69, 2002.
[22] R.M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books 1984.
[23] J.J. Jaramillo and R. Srikant, "DARWIN: Distributed and Adaptive Reputation Mechanism for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks," Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2007.
[24] D. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, second ed., vols. 1 and 2. Athena Scientific, 2001.
[25] G. Ellison, "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Rev. of Economic Studies, vol. 61, pp. 567-588, 1994.
[26] L.A. DaSilva and V. Srivastava, "Node Participation in Peer-to-Peer and Ad Hoc Networks: A Game Theoretic Formulation," Proc. Games and Emergent Behavior in Distributed Computation Workshop, Sept. 2004.
[27] D.B. Johnson and D.A. Maltz, "Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks," Mobile Computing, pp. 153-181, Kluwer Academic, 2000.
13 ms
(Ver 2.0)

Marketing Automation Platform Marketing Automation Tool