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Issue No.07 - July (2009 vol.8)
pp: 968-974
Benjamin Arazi , Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva
RFID and Wireless Sensor Networks exemplify computationally constrained environments, where the compact nature of the components cannot support complex computations or high communication overhead. On the other hand, such components should support security applications such as message integrity, authentication, and time stamping. The latter are efficiently implemented by Hash Message Authentication Codes (HMAC). As clearly stated in the literature, current approved implementations of HMAC require resources that cannot be supported in constrained components. An approach to implement a compact HMAC by the use of stream ciphering is presented in this paper.
Secured communications, HMAC, constrained environments, challenge response, stream ciphers.
Benjamin Arazi, "Message Authentication in Computationally Constrained Environments", IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.8, no. 7, pp. 968-974, July 2009, doi:10.1109/TMC.2009.40
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3 ms
(Ver 2.0)

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