How Much to Share: A Repeated Game Model for Peer-to-Peer Streaming under Service Differentiation Incentives
Issue No. 02 - February (2012 vol. 23)
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2011.167
Xin Xiao , Tsinghua University, Beijing and MCC CISDI Info Cooperation, Chongqing
Qian Zhang , Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
Yuanchun Shi , Tsinghua University, Beijing
Yuan Gao , Tsinghua University, Beijing
In this paper, we propose a service differentiation incentive for P2P streaming system, according to peers' instant contributions. Also, a repeated game model is designed to analyze how much the peers should contribute in each round under this incentive. Simulations show that satisfying streaming quality is achieved in the Nash Equilibrium state.
Free riding, incentives, game theory, Nash Equilibrium, P2P streaming.
Y. Shi, Y. Gao, X. Xiao and Q. Zhang, "How Much to Share: A Repeated Game Model for Peer-to-Peer Streaming under Service Differentiation Incentives," in IEEE Transactions on Parallel & Distributed Systems, vol. 23, no. , pp. 288-295, 2011.