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Issue No.04 - April (2011 vol.60)
pp: 580-593
Ping Xu , Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
Xiang-Yang Li , Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
Shaojie Tang , Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
JiZhong Zhao , Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for wireless access networks. We assume that each secondary user will bid a certain value for exclusive usage of some spectrum channels for a certain time period or for a certain time duration. A secondary user may also require the exclusive usage of a subset of channels, or require the exclusive usage of a certain number of channels. Thus, several versions of problems are formulated under various different assumptions. For the majority of problems, we design PTAS or efficient constant-approximation algorithms such that overall profit is maximized. Here, the profit is defined as the total bids of all satisfied secondary users. As a side product of our algorithms, we are able to show that a previously studied Scheduling Split Interval Problem (SSIP) [CHECK END OF SENTENCE], in which each job is composed of t intervals, cannot be approximated within O(t^{1-\epsilon }) for any small \epsilon >0 unless {\rm NP}={\rm ZPP}. Opportunistic spectrum usage, although a promising technology, could suffer from the selfish behavior of secondary users. In order to improve opportunistic spectrum usage, we then propose to combine the game theory with wireless modeling. We show how to design a truthful mechanism based on all of these algorithms such that the best strategy of each secondary user to maximize its own profit is to truthfully report its actual bid.
Wireless networks, spectrum, disk graph, interval graph, PTAS, approximation, strategyproof.
Ping Xu, Xiang-Yang Li, Shaojie Tang, JiZhong Zhao, "Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks", IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol.60, no. 4, pp. 580-593, April 2011, doi:10.1109/TC.2010.241
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