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Issue No. 08 - August (2008 vol. 57)
ISSN: 0018-9340
pp: 1087-1097
Vanesa Daza , Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona
Javier Herranz , CSIC, Spanish National Research Council , Bellaterra
Germán Sáez , Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Barcelona
In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers help a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a non-corrupted group. In this work we formalize the security analysis of one of such schemes \\cite{DHPS02}, which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in \\cite{NPR99}, which allows to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss.
Public key cryptosystems, Cryptographic controls

V. Daza, J. Herranz and G. Sáez, "On the Computational Security of a Distributed Key Distribution Scheme," in IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 57, no. , pp. 1087-1097, 2008.
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