Issue No. 05 - May (2007 vol. 56)
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2007.1015
Israel Koren , IEEE
One of the most effective ways of attacking a cryptographic device is by deliberate fault injection during computation, which allows retrieving the secret key with a small number of attempts. Several attacks on symmetric and public-key cryptosystems have been described in the literature and some dedicated error-detection techniques have been proposed to foil them. The proposed techniques are ad hoc ones and exploit specific properties of the cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we propose a general framework for error detection in symmetric ciphers based on an operation-centered approach. We first enumerate the arithmetic and logic operations included in the cipher and analyze the efficacy and hardware complexity of several error-detecting codes for each such operation. We then recommend an error-detecting code for the cipher as a whole based on the operations it employs. We also deal with the trade-off between the frequency of checking for errors and the error coverage. We demonstrate our framework on a representative group of 11 symmetric ciphers. Our conclusions are supported by both analytical proofs and extensive simulation experiments.
Cryptography, symmetric cipher, error-detecting code, parity code, residue code, fault attacks, fault detection.
I. Koren, P. Maistri and L. Breveglieri, "An Operation-Centered Approach to Fault Detection in Symmetric Cryptography Ciphers," in IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 56, no. , pp. 635-649, 2007.