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The above-cited paper appeared in the April 2002 issue of these transactions. The author has submitted the following corrections/clarifications to the paper:

    1. In the fault detection stage of Section 4 of the paper, it is obvious that $\big. U_i\bigr.$ should not broadcast $\big. S_i\bigr.$, which is used in ElGamal signature. We should simply delete $\big. S_i\bigr.$ from the fault detection message since it is not used at all. Therefore, the "Fault detection" stage should be corrected as follows:

      a. In Step 3ai, it should be "Output $\big. R_i,K_i\bigr.$."

      b. In Step 3bi, it should be "Wait for $\big. U_m\bigr.$'s fault detection messages $\big. R_m,K_M\bigr.$."

      c. In Step 3biii, it should be "On receiving $\big. R_m,K_M,\cdots\bigr.$."

    2. This is to clarify that following the general practice of deterring the "replay" attack, each broadcast message should have an inseparable stage to show its "timeliness."

    The author is with the Department of Computer and Information Science, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan 30050.


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