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2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) (2016)
San Jose, CA, USA
May 22, 2016 to May 26, 2016
ISBN: 978-1-5090-3691-2
pp: 179-184
We previously presented a theory of analysis for expressive low-level languages that is capable of proving non-interference for expressive languages. We now provide an independent result for the taint-flow analysis that drives tracking of information. In particular, we show that the taint-tracking can be derived from the results of a taint-free analysis. In addition to improving performance, this independence broadens the applicability of the underlying approach to information-flow analysis.
Context, Security, Interference, Concrete, Optimization, Privacy, Conferences

P. Aldous and M. Might, "A Posteriori Taint-Tracking for Demonstrating Non-interference in Expressive Low-Level Languages," 2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), San Jose, CA, USA, 2016, pp. 179-184.
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