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2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2013)
Berkeley, CA, USA USA
May 19, 2013 to May 22, 2013
ISSN: 1081-6011
ISBN: 978-1-4673-6166-8
pp: 206-220
Privacy has become an issue of paramount importance for many users. As a result, encryption tools such as True Crypt, OS-based full-disk encryption such as File Vault, and privacy modes in all modern browsers have become popular. However, although such tools are useful, they are not perfect. For example, prior work has shown that browsers still leave many traces of user information on disk even if they are started in private browsing mode. In addition, disk encryption alone is not sufficient, as key disclosure through coercion remains possible. Clearly, it would be useful and highly desirable to have OS-level support that provides strong privacy guarantees for any application -- not only browsers. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of PrivExec, the first operating system service for private execution. PrivExec provides strong, general guarantees of private execution, allowing any application to execute in a mode where storage writes, either to the filesystem or to swap, will not be recoverable by others during or after execution. PrivExec does not require explicit application support, recompilation, or any other preconditions. We have implemented a prototype of PrivExec by extending the Linux kernel that is performant, practical, and that secures sensitive data against disclosure.
operating systems, privacy

K. Onarlioglu, C. Mulliner, W. Robertson and E. Kirda, "PrivExec: Private Execution as an Operating System Service," 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy(SP), Berkeley, CA, USA USA, 2013, pp. 206-220.
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