2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) (2007)
May 20, 2007 to May 23, 2007
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SP.2007.27
Jonathan M. McCune , Carnegie Mellon University
Bryan Parno , Carnegie Mellon University
Adrian Perrig , Carnegie Mellon University
Michael K. Reiter , Carnegie Mellon University
Arvind Seshadri , Carnegie Mellon University
We propose an architecture that allows code to execute in complete isolation from other software while trusting only a tiny software base that is orders of magnitude smaller than even minimalist virtual machine monitors. Our technique also enables more meaningful attestation than previous proposals, since only measurements of the security-sensitive portions of an application need to be included. We achieve these guarantees by leveraging hardware support provided by commodity processors from AMD and Intel that are shipping today.
Operating systems, Computer architecture, Information security, Virtual machine monitors, Hardware, Kernel, Cryptography, Proposals, Sea measurements, Application software
J. M. McCune, B. Parno, A. Perrig, M. K. Reiter and A. Seshadri, "Minimal TCB Code Execution," 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)(SP), Berkeley, California, 2008, pp. 267-272.