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2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003. (2003)
Berkeley, CA
May 11, 2003 to May 14, 2003
ISSN: 1540-7993
ISBN: 0-7695-1940-7
pp: 197
Haowen Chan , Carnegie Mellon University
Adrian Perrig , Carnegie Mellon University
Dawn Song , Carnegie Mellon University
ABSTRACT
Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using the framework of pre-distributing a random set of keys to each node. First, in the q-composite keys scheme, we trade off the unlikeliness of a large-scale network attack in order to significantly strengthen random key predistribution?s strength against smaller-scale attacks. Second, in the multipath-reinforcement scheme, we show how to strengthen the security between any two nodes by leveraging the security of other links. Finally, we present the random-pairwise keys scheme, which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network when any node is captured, and also enables node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation.
INDEX TERMS
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CITATION

D. Song, A. Perrig and H. Chan, "Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks," 2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003.(SP), Berkeley, CA, 2003, pp. 197.
doi:10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199337
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