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2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003. (2003)
Berkeley, CA
May 11, 2003 to May 14, 2003
ISSN: 1540-7993
ISBN: 0-7695-1940-7
pp: 180
Dirk Balfanz , Palo Alto Research Center
Glenn Durfee , Palo Alto Research Center
Narendar Shankar , University of Maryland
Diana Smetters , Palo Alto Research Center
Jessica Staddon , Palo Alto Research Center
Hao-Chi Wong , Palo Alto Research Center
Consider a CIA agent who wants to authenticate herself to a server, but does not want to reveal her CIA credentials unless the server is a genuine CIA outlet. Consider also that the CIA server does not want to reveal its CIA credentials to anyone but CIA agents - not even to other CIA servers.<div></div> In this paper we first show how pairing-based cryptography can be used to implement such secret handshakes. We then propose a formal definition for secure secret handshakes, and prove that our pairing-based schemes are secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocols support role-based group membership authentication, traceability, indistinguishability to eavesdroppers, unbounded collusion resistance, and forward repudiability.<div></div> Our secret-handshake scheme can be implemented as a TLS cipher suite. We report on the performance of our preliminary Java implementation.

N. Shankar, H. Wong, D. Balfanz, D. Smetters, G. Durfee and J. Staddon, "Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements," 2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003.(SP), Berkeley, CA, 2003, pp. 180.
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