Aug. 31, 2005 to Sept. 2, 2005
Sergio Marti , Stanford University
Hector Garcia-Molina , Stanford University
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/P2P.2005.29
Our research proposes a simple buyer/seller game that captures the incentives dictating the interaction between peers in resource trading peer-to-peer networks. We prove that for simple reputation-based buyer strategies, a seller?s decision whether to cheat or not is dependent only on the length of its transaction history, not on the particular actions committed. Given a finite number of transactions, a peer can compute a utility optimal sequence of cooperations and defections. With the limited information provided by many reputation systems, a peer has incentive to defect on a large fraction of its transactions. If temporal information is used, equilibrium is reached when peers predominantly cooperate.
Sergio Marti, Hector Garcia-Molina, "Quantifying Agent Strategies under Reputation", P2P, 2005, Peer-to-Peer Computing, IEEE International Conference on, Peer-to-Peer Computing, IEEE International Conference on 2005, pp. 97-105, doi:10.1109/P2P.2005.29