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2017 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) (2017)
Heraklion, Greece
July 3, 2017 to July 6, 2017
ISBN: 978-1-5386-1630-7
pp: 742-747
Mohammad Aghababaie Alavijeh , ECE, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Iran
Behrouz Maham , School of Engineering, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhu Han , Department of ECE, University of Houston, TX 77004, USA
Walid Saad , Department of ECE, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, 24060, USA
One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming attacks, designing anti-jamming defense mechanisms is equally important. In this paper, we propose a truthful mechanism, robust against the jamming, for a dynamic stochastic cognitive radio network consisting of several selfish secondary users and a malicious user. In this model, each secondary user participates in an auction and wish to use the unjammed spectrum, and the malicious user aims at jamming a channel by corrupting the communication link. A truthful auction mechanism is designed among the secondary users. Furthermore, a zero-sum game is formulated between the set of secondary users and the malicious user. This joint problem is then cast as a randomized two-level auctions in which the first auction allocates the vacant channels, and then the second one assigns the remaining unallocated channels. Simulation results show that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance that is close to the centralized algorithm.
Games, Jamming, Stochastic processes, Resource management, Electronic mail, Game theory, Computers

M. A. Alavijeh, B. Maham, Z. Han and W. Saad, "Truthful spectrum auction for efficient anti-jamming in cognitive radio networks," 2017 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC), Heraklion, Greece, 2017, pp. 742-747.
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