Formal Engineering Methods, International Conference on (1997)
Nov. 12, 1997 to Nov. 14, 1997
We address the formal analysis of authentication cryptographic protocols. We present a new verification algorithm that generates from the protocol description the set of possible flaws, if any, as well as the corresponding attack scenarios. This algorithm does not require any property or invariant specification. The algorithm involves three steps: extracting the protocol roles, modeling the intruder abilities and verification. In addition to the classical known intruder computational abilities such as encryption and decryption, we also consider those computations that result from different instrumentations of the protocol. The intruder abilities are modeled as a deductive system. The verification is based on the extracted roles as well as the deductive system. It consists in checking whether the intruder can answer all the challenges uttered by a particular role. If it is the case, an attack scenario is automatically constructed. The extracted proof system does not ensure the termination of deductions. For that purpose, we present a general transformation schema that allows one to automatically rewrite the non-terminating proof system into a terminating one. The transformation schema is shown to be correct. To exemplify the usefulness and efficiency of our approach, we illustrate it on the Woo and Lam authentication protocol. Abadi and Needham have shown that the protocol is insecure and they proposed a new corrected version. Thanks to this method we have discovered new unknown flaws in the Woo and Lam protocol and in the corrected version of Abadi and Needham.
Algorithm, Automatic Formal Verification, Cryptographic Protocols, Authentication, Proof System, Flaws, Attack Scenario, Termination
I. Yahmadi, N. Tawbi, M. Mejri and M. Debbabi, "Formal Automatic Verification of Authentication Cryptographic Protocols," Formal Engineering Methods, International Conference on(ICFEM), Hiroshima, JAPAN, 1997, pp. 50.