The Effect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: Towards Collective Decision Making on the Internet
Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (2000)
Apr. 10, 2000 to Apr. 13, 2000
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a collective decision making problem in an open, dynamic environment, such as the Internet. More specifically, we study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants (agents) of the mechanism. A typical example of such a situation is Internet auctions.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We develop a formal model of a mechanism design problem in which false-name declarations are possible, and prove that the revelation principle still holds in this model.2) When false-name declarations and hiding are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto efficient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium for all cases.3) We show a sufficient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of agents).
M. Yokoo, Y. Sakurai and S. Matsubara, "The Effect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: Towards Collective Decision Making on the Internet," Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems(ICDCS), Taipei, Taiwan, 2000, pp. 146.