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2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) (2014)
Arlington, VA, USA
May 6, 2014 to May 7, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4799-4114-8
pp: 7-12
Meenatchi Jagasivamani , Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, 3811 N. Fairfax Dr. Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
Peter Gadfort , Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, 3811 N. Fairfax Dr. Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
Michel Sika , Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, 3811 N. Fairfax Dr. Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
Michael Bajura , Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, 3811 N. Fairfax Dr. Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
Michael Fritze , Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, 3811 N. Fairfax Dr. Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
ABSTRACT
Split-fabrication has been proposed as an approach for secure and trusted access to advanced microelectronics manufacturing capability using un-trusted sources. Each wafer to be manufactured is processed by two semiconductor foundries, combining the front-end capabilities of an advanced but untrusted semiconductor foundry with the back-end capabilities a trusted semiconductor foundry. Since the security of split fabrication relates directly to a front-end foundry's ability to interpret the partial circuit designs it receives, metrics are needed to evaluate the obfuscation of these designs as well as circuit design techniques to alter these metrics. This paper quantitatively examines several “front-end” obfuscation techniques and metrics inspired by information theory, and evaluates their impact on design effort, area, and performance penalties.
INDEX TERMS
Measurement, Foundries, Entropy, Standards, Libraries, Logic gates, Manufacturing
CITATION

M. Jagasivamani, P. Gadfort, M. Sika, M. Bajura and M. Fritze, "Split-fabrication obfuscation: Metrics and techniques," 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), Arlington, VA, USA, 2014, pp. 7-12.
doi:10.1109/HST.2014.6855560
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