The Community for Technology Leaders
37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the (2004)
Big Island, Hawaii
Jan. 5, 2004 to Jan. 8, 2004
ISSN: 1530-1605
ISBN: 0-7695-2056-1
pp: 20049c
ABSTRACT
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each bidder is independently selecting its bid to maximize profits based on its estimate of the residual demand curve it faces. The supplier bids a price for its energy capacity to optimize its marginal tradeoff between higher prices and lower quantities. Price response from either demand or other suppliers prevents the supplier from raising its bid too much. Profit maximizing bidding should be expected and encouraged by regulators. It is precisely this profit maximizing behavior that guides the market toward long-run efficient outcomes.
INDEX TERMS
null
CITATION

"Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets," 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the(HICSS), Big Island, Hawaii, 2004, pp. 20049c.
doi:10.1109/HICSS.2004.10020
90 ms
(Ver 3.3 (11022016))