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Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2002)
Big Island, Hawaii
Jan. 7, 2002 to Jan. 10, 2002
ISBN: 0-7695-1435-9
pp: 53
ABSTRACT
We model energy multi-markets with load serving entities (LSEs) as participants, as non-linear discrete-time dynamical systems and use Nash bidding strategies for the LSEs. The optimal bidding strategies are developed mathematically using dynamic Nash game theory. The equations for complex non-linear energy multi-markets are linearized. The actual dynamic excursions from the desired trajectory around which we linearize are small so that the linearization is valid. The developed algorithm for bidding strategies is applied to an IEEE 14-bus power system for two cases: (1) No transmission capacity constraints, (2) Transmission capacity limit constraints on two groups of transmission lines. The LSEs' expected profits are higher for our method than those for other methods in the literature.
INDEX TERMS
energy multi-markets, dynamic game theory, bidding strategies, load-serving entities (LSE), Nash strategies
CITATION

J. Cruz Jr and A. Kian, "Nash Strategies for Load Serving Entities in Dynamic Energy Multi-markets," Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences(HICSS), Big Island, Hawaii, 2002, pp. 53.
doi:10.1109/HICSS.2002.993955
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