The Community for Technology Leaders
Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2001)
Maui, Hawaii
Jan. 3, 2001 to Jan. 6, 2001
ISSN: 1530-1605
ISBN: 0-7695-0981-9
pp: 1040
We study electronic bidding and contracting for non-storable goods such as electric power using multi-GA agents and game theoretical approaches. In this framework, there is a long-term contract market as well as a backstop spot market. Seller agents bid into an electronic bulletin board their contract offers in terms of price or capacity, while Buyer agents decide how much to contract with Seller agents and how much to shop from the spot market. The problem is modeled as a von-Stackelberg game with Sellers as leaders. We investigate if artificial agents will be able to discover equilibrium strategies if such an equilibrium exists; and if the agents can discover good and effective strategies when playing repeated non-linear games where there does not exist any equilibrium. This study is a companion of our earlier theoretical characterizations on optimal bidding and contracting strategies for non-storable goods, now adopting an agent-based approach.
Multi-Agent Systems, Bidding, Contracting, Negotiation, Genetic Algorithms, Game Theory

D. Wu and Y. Sun, "Multi-Agent Bidding and Contracting for Non-Storable Goods," Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences(HICSS), Maui, Hawaii, 2001, pp. 1040.
85 ms
(Ver 3.3 (11022016))