2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2012)
New Brunswick, NJ, USA USA
Oct. 20, 2012 to Oct. 23, 2012
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2012.36
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.
exponential mechanism, mechanism design, differential privacy
Z. Huang and S. Kannan, "The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal," 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science(FOCS), New Brunswick, NJ, USA USA, 2012, pp. 140-149.