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2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2008)
Oct. 25, 2008 to Oct. 28, 2008
ISSN: 0272-5428
ISBN: 978-0-7695-3436-7
pp: 260-269
ABSTRACT
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
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CITATION

R. Lavi, S. Dobzinski and N. Nisan, "Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits," 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science(FOCS), vol. 00, no. , pp. 260-269, 2008.
doi:10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
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