2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2008)
Oct. 25, 2008 to Oct. 28, 2008
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
R. Lavi, S. Dobzinski and N. Nisan, "Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits," 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science(FOCS), vol. 00, no. , pp. 260-269, 2008.