2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2008)

Oct. 25, 2008 to Oct. 28, 2008

ISSN: 0272-5428

ISBN: 978-0-7695-3436-7

pp: 243-249

DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2008.87

ABSTRACT

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial votingmethod among at least 3 alternatives can be strategicallymanipulated. We prove a quantitative version of theGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a singlerandom voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for everyneutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from beinga dictatorship.

INDEX TERMS

Computational game theory, social choice, elections

CITATION

E. Friedgut, G. Kalai and N. Nisan, "Elections Can be Manipulated Often,"

*2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science(FOCS)*, vol. 00, no. , pp. 243-249, 2008.

doi:10.1109/FOCS.2008.87

CITATIONS