2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2008)
Oct. 25, 2008 to Oct. 28, 2008
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2008.87
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial votingmethod among at least 3 alternatives can be strategicallymanipulated. We prove a quantitative version of theGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a singlerandom voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for everyneutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from beinga dictatorship.
Computational game theory, social choice, elections
E. Friedgut, G. Kalai and N. Nisan, "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science(FOCS), vol. 00, no. , pp. 243-249, 2008.