The Community for Technology Leaders
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2006)
Berkeley, California
Oct. 21, 2006 to Oct. 24, 2006
ISSN: 0272-5428
ISBN: 0-7695-2720-5
pp: 239-248
Rafail Ostrovsky , UCLA, USA
Eyal Kushilevitz , Technion, Israel
Amit Sahai , UCLA, USA
Yuval Ishai , Technion, Israel
There is a vast body of work on implementing anonymous communication. In this paper, we study the possibility of using anonymous communication as a building block, and show that one can leverage on anonymity in a variety of cryptographic contexts. Our results go in two directions. <p> --Feasibility. We show that anonymous communication over insecure channels can be used to implement unconditionally secure point-to-point channels, broadcast, and generalmulti-party protocols that remain unconditionally secure as long as less than half of the players are maliciously corrupted.</p> <p> --Efficiency. We show that anonymous channels can yield substantial efficiency improvements for several natural secure computation tasks. In particular, we present the first solution to the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) which can handle multiple users while being close to optimal with respect to both communication and computation.</p>
Rafail Ostrovsky, Eyal Kushilevitz, Amit Sahai, Yuval Ishai, "Cryptography from Anonymity", 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, vol. 00, no. , pp. 239-248, 2006, doi:10.1109/FOCS.2006.25
89 ms
(Ver 3.3 (11022016))