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Berkeley, California
Oct. 21, 2006 to Oct. 24, 2006
ISBN: 0-7695-2720-5
pp: 239-248
Yuval Ishai , Technion, Israel
Eyal Kushilevitz , Technion, Israel
Rafail Ostrovsky , UCLA, USA
Amit Sahai , UCLA, USA
There is a vast body of work on implementing anonymous communication. In this paper, we study the possibility of using anonymous communication as a building block, and show that one can leverage on anonymity in a variety of cryptographic contexts. Our results go in two directions. <p> --Feasibility. We show that anonymous communication over insecure channels can be used to implement unconditionally secure point-to-point channels, broadcast, and generalmulti-party protocols that remain unconditionally secure as long as less than half of the players are maliciously corrupted.</p> <p> --Efficiency. We show that anonymous channels can yield substantial efficiency improvements for several natural secure computation tasks. In particular, we present the first solution to the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) which can handle multiple users while being close to optimal with respect to both communication and computation.</p>
Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai, "Cryptography from Anonymity", FOCS, 2006, 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2006, pp. 239-248, doi:10.1109/FOCS.2006.25
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