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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Oct. 23, 2005 to Oct. 25, 2005
ISBN: 0-7695-2468-0
pp: 585-595
Sergei Izmalkov , Dept of Economics, MIT
Silvio Micali , CSAIL, MIT
Matt Lepinski , CSAIL, MIT
ABSTRACT
<p>Secure Computation essentially guarantees that whatever computation n players can do with the help of a trusted party, they can also do by themselves. Fundamentally, however, this notion depends on the honesty of at least some players.</p> <p>We put forward and implement a stronger notion, Rational Secure Computation, that does not depend on player honesty, but solely on player rationality. The key to our implementation is showing that the ballotbox -the venerable device used throughout the world to tally secret votes securely can actually be used to securely compute any function.</p> <p>Our work bridges the fields of Game Theory and Cryptography, and has broad implications for Mechanism Design.</p>
INDEX TERMS
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CITATION
Sergei Izmalkov, Silvio Micali, Matt Lepinski, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design", FOCS, 2005, 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2005, pp. 585-595, doi:10.1109/SFCS.2005.64
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