The Community for Technology Leaders
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2005)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Oct. 23, 2005 to Oct. 25, 2005
ISBN: 0-7695-2468-0
pp: 585-595
Silvio Micali , CSAIL, MIT
Matt Lepinski , CSAIL, MIT
Sergei Izmalkov , Dept of Economics, MIT
<p>Secure Computation essentially guarantees that whatever computation n players can do with the help of a trusted party, they can also do by themselves. Fundamentally, however, this notion depends on the honesty of at least some players.</p> <p>We put forward and implement a stronger notion, Rational Secure Computation, that does not depend on player honesty, but solely on player rationality. The key to our implementation is showing that the ballotbox -the venerable device used throughout the world to tally secret votes securely can actually be used to securely compute any function.</p> <p>Our work bridges the fields of Game Theory and Cryptography, and has broad implications for Mechanism Design.</p>
Silvio Micali, Matt Lepinski, Sergei Izmalkov, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design", 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, vol. 00, no. , pp. 585-595, 2005, doi:10.1109/SFCS.2005.64
107 ms
(Ver 3.3 (11022016))