44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings. (2003)

Cambridge, Massachusettes

Oct. 11, 2003 to Oct. 14, 2003

ISSN: 0272-5428

ISBN: 0-7695-2040-5

pp: 584

Martin Pál , Cornell University

Éva Tardo , Cornell University

ABSTRACT

We develop a general method for turning a primal-dual algorithm into a group strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism. We use our method to design approximately budget balanced cost sharing mechanisms for two NP-complete problems: metric facility location, and single source rentor-buy network design. Both mechanisms are competitive, group strategyproof and recover a constant fraction of the cost. For the facility location game our cost-sharing method recovers a 1/3rd of the total cost, while in the network design game the cost shares pay for a 1/15 fraction of the cost of the solution.

INDEX TERMS

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CITATION

&. Tardo and M. Pál, "Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms,"

*44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings.(FOCS)*, Cambridge, Massachusettes, 2003, pp. 584.

doi:10.1109/SFCS.2003.1238231

CITATIONS