The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. (2002)
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Nov. 16, 2002 to Nov. 19, 2002
Liad Blumrosen , Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Noam Nisan , Hebrew University of Jerusalem
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally efficient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.
L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan, "Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings.(FOCS), Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2002, pp. 406.