The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. (2002)

Vancouver, BC, Canada

Nov. 16, 2002 to Nov. 19, 2002

ISSN: 0272-5428

ISBN: 0-7695-1822-2

pp: 406

Liad Blumrosen , Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Noam Nisan , Hebrew University of Jerusalem

ABSTRACT

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally efficient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.

INDEX TERMS

null

CITATION

L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan, "Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication,"

*The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings.(FOCS)*, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2002, pp. 406.

doi:10.1109/SFCS.2002.1181965

CITATIONS