Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE (2002)
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada
June 24, 2002 to June 26, 2002
Levente Buttyán , Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne
Jean-Pierre Hubaux , Swiss Federal Institute of Technology — Lausanne
Srdjan Capkun , Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.
J. Hubaux, S. Capkun and L. Buttyán, "A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol," Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE(CSFW), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2002, pp. 193.