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2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) (2016)
Lisbon, Portugal
June 27, 2016 to July 1, 2016
ISSN: 2374-8303
ISBN: 978-1-5090-2608-1
pp: 105-119
Attack-defence trees are a powerful technique for formally evaluating attack-defence scenarios. They represent in an intuitive, graphical way the interaction between an attacker and a defender who compete in order to achieve conflicting objectives. We propose a novel framework for the formal analysis of quantitative properties of complex attack-defence scenarios, using an extension of attack-defence trees which models temporal ordering of actions and allows explicit dependencies in the strategies adopted by attackers and defenders. We adopt a game-theoretic approach, translating attack-defence trees to two-player stochastic games, and then employ probabilistic model checking techniques to formally analyse these models. This provides a means to both verify formally specified security properties of the attack-defence scenarios and, dually, to synthesise strategies for attackers or defenders which guarantee or optimise some quantitative property, such as the probability of a successful attack, the expected cost incurred, or some multi-objective trade-off between the two. We implement our approach, building upon the PRISM-games model checker, and apply it to a case study of an RFID goods management system.
formal specification, formal verification, probability, security of data, stochastic games

Z. Aslanyan, F. Nielson and D. Parker, "Quantitative Verification and Synthesis of Attack-Defence Scenarios," 2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), Lisbon, Portugal, 2016, pp. 105-119.
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