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2017 13th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS) (2017)
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Dec 15, 2017 to Dec 18, 2017
ISBN: 978-1-5386-4822-3
pp: 566-569
ABSTRACT
Hardware trojans have posed great threats to the security of cryptographic devices, due to their invisibility and difficulty of removal. Trojan side-channel (TSC) is a kind of hardware trojan which leaks side channel information of the secrets in the devices. In this article, we present a new implementation of TSC for FPGAs. In the experiments, to verify its feasibility, we analysis the leakage model of our TSC implementation on FPGAs. Moreover, to resist the TSC detection, we apply a masking technique to our scheme by blinding the output of our TSC.
INDEX TERMS
cryptography, field programmable gate arrays, invasive software
CITATION

W. Meng et al., "An Implementation of Trojan Side-Channel with a Masking Scheme," 2017 13th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2018, pp. 566-569.
doi:10.1109/CIS.2017.00131
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