2013 Ninth International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (2009)
Dec. 11, 2009 to Dec. 14, 2009
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CIS.2009.145
In our paper, a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers is introduced. The products are perishable and sold over a single selling season. Traditionally, the retailers order products in the selling season, and the dynamic games between the supplier and retailers are constructed. Now the supplier gives one of the retailers a chance to order products before the selling season, and dynamic game is further analyzed. The model has shown that, below a threshold level of demand uncertainty, the supplier can benefit from providing adequate pricing incentives to entice the retailer to order products before demand information is revealed.
supply chain; game; advance order; backward induction
J. Cai and L. Wang, "Study on Dynamic Game Models in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain," 2009 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security(CIS), Beijing, China, 2009, pp. 138-141.