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Munich, Germany
July 19, 2005 to July 22, 2005
ISBN: 0-7695-2277-7
pp: 330-337
D. Garg , Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore
Y. Narahari , Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore
Earnest Foster , General Motors Research and Development
Devadatta Kulkarni , General Motors Research and Development
Jeffrey D. Tew , General Motors Research and Development
ABSTRACT
In this paper, a generic optimization problem arising in supply chain design is modeled in a game theoretic framework and solved as a decentralized problem using a mechanism design approach. We show that the entities in a supply chain network can be naturally modeled as selfish, rational, and intelligent agents interested in maximizing certain payoffs. This enables us to define a supply chain design game and we show that the well known Groves mechanisms can be used to solve the underlying design optimization problem. We illustrate our approach with a representative three stage distribution process of a typical automotive supply chain.
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CITATION
D. Garg, Y. Narahari, Earnest Foster, Devadatta Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew, "A Groves Mechanism Approach to Decentralized Design of Supply Chains", CEC, 2005, Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05), Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05) 2005, pp. 330-337, doi:10.1109/ICECT.2005.5
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