2018 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA) (2018)
May 16, 2018 to May 18, 2018
When a user consumes an encrypted digital content (for example video and music files), the player application accesses the secret key to decrypt the content. If the user is malicious, he can analyse the access pattern of the player application to extract the secret key efficiently. Oblivious RAMs (ORAMs) are effective solution for such threats. However, ORAMs are only effective for `passive' attackers who can observe the RAM access done by the application, but cannot alter data stored on RAM. The attacker with ability to alter data on RAM can be called `active' attackers. In this paper, we evaluate the security of ORAM schemes against active adversaries where they alter data on RAM and try to efficiently extract the secret information. We also propose countermeasures against active adversaries.
private key cryptography, random-access storage, telecommunication security
Y. Nakano, S. Hidano, S. Kiyomoto and K. Sakurai, "Active Attack Against Oblivious RAM," 2018 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA), Krakow, Poland, 2018, pp. 744-751.