Dec. 5, 2005 to Dec. 9, 2005
Jason Waddle , University of California, Berkeley
David Wagner , University of California, Berkeley
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.25
Fault induction attacks are a serious concern for designers of secure embedded systems. An ideal solution would be a generic circuit transformation that would produce circuits that are robust against fault induction attacks. We develop a framework for analyzing the security of systems against single fault attacks and apply it to a recent proposed method (dual-rail encoding) for generically securing circuits against single fault attacks. Ultimately, we find that the method does not hold up under our threat models: n-bit cryptographic keys can be extracted from the device with roughly n trials. We conclude that secure designs should incorporate explicit countermeasures to either directly address or attempt to invalidate our threat models.
Jason Waddle, David Wagner, "Fault Attacks on Dual-Rail Encoded Systems", ACSAC, 2005, Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual, Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual 2005, pp. 483-494, doi:10.1109/CSAC.2005.25