Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual (2005)
Dec. 5, 2005 to Dec. 9, 2005
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSAC.2005.55
Patrick McDaniel , Pennsylvania State University
William Enck , Pennsylvania State University
Wesam Lootah , Pennsylvania State University
IP networks fundamentally rely on the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) for proper operation. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities in the ARP protocol enable a raft of IP-based impersonation, man-in-the-middle, or DoS attacks. Proposed countermeasures to these vulnerabilities have yet to simultaneously address backward compatibility and cost requirements. This paper introduces the Ticket-based Address Resolution Protocol (TARP). TARP implements security by distributing centrally issued secure MAC/IP address mapping attestations through existing ARP messages. We detail the TARP protocol and its implementation within the Linux operating system. Our experimental analysis shows that TARP improves the costs of implementing ARP security by as much as two orders of magnitude over existing protocols. We conclude by exploring a range of operational issues associated with deploying and administering ARP security.
Patrick McDaniel, William Enck, Wesam Lootah, "TARP: Ticket-based Address Resolution Protocol", Computer Security Applications Conference, Annual, vol. 00, no. , pp. 106-116, 2005, doi:10.1109/CSAC.2005.55