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Issue No.05 - Sept.-Oct. (2012 vol.10)
pp: 42-49
Philip B. Stark , University of California, Berkeley
Risk-limiting audits provide statistical assurance that election outcomes are correct by manually examining portions of the audit trail—paper ballots or voter-verifiable paper records. This article sketches two types of risk-limiting audits, ballot-polling audits and comparison audits, and gives example computations. These audits do not require in-house statistical expertise.
Privacy, Security, Manuals, Nominations and elections, Software, Electronic voting, Special issues and sections, hypothesis tests, election verification, election integrity, sequential sampling
Mark Lindeman, Philip B. Stark, "A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.10, no. 5, pp. 42-49, Sept.-Oct. 2012, doi:10.1109/MSP.2012.56
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15. T. Magrino et al., “Computing the Margin of Victory in IRV Elections,” Proc. 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 11), Usenix Assoc., 2001; Magrino.pdf.
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