Issue No.05 - September/October (2009 vol.7)
Ioannis Avramopoulos , Deutsche Telekom Laboratories
Martin Suchara , Princeton University
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2009.131
The Domain Name System is a critical piece of the Internet and supports most Internet applications. Because it's organized in a hierarchy, its correct operation depends on the availability of just a few servers at the hierarchy's upper levels. These backbone servers are vulnerable to routing attacks in which adversaries controlling part of the routing system try to hijack the server address space. Using routing attacks in this way, an adversary can compromise the Internet's availability and integrity at a global scale. In this article, the authors evaluate the relative resilience to routing attacks of two alternative anycast DNS implementations. The first operates at the network layer and the second at the application layer. The evaluation informs fundamental DNS design decisions and an important debate on the routing architecture of the Internet.
Domain Name System, DNS, anycast, secure routing
Ioannis Avramopoulos, Martin Suchara, "Protecting the DNS from Routing Attacks: Two Alternative Anycast Implementations", IEEE Security & Privacy, vol.7, no. 5, pp. 14-20, September/October 2009, doi:10.1109/MSP.2009.131