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Issue No.04 - October-December (2002 vol.24)
pp: 14-31`
<p>In the second of this two-part series, these memoirs feature Goetz?s role in growing ADR to a $200,000,000 company and in ADAPSO, which dealt with industry issues and fought for a level playing field as IBM began to exert its enormous marketing powers and resources in the licensing of its program products.</p>
Martin Goetz, "Memoirs of a Software Pioneer: Part 2", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, vol.24, no. 4, pp. 14-31`, October-December 2002, doi:10.1109/MAHC.2002.1114867
1. The term account control as applied to IBM had a special meaning. IBM sold its computer hardware at a company's highest executive levels. It tried to use the relationships formed at these levels to influence and control internal decisions made at middle management levels. An example of IBM account control can be found on the Software History Center Web site ( ) as "How IBM Killed the Market for Boole and Babbage's CUE Product."
2. The 1956 Consent Decree required that IBM operate its Service Bureau Corporation (SBC) as a completely separate entity and not in any way capitalize on IBM's name, employees, reputation, and financial assets. The entire Consent Decree, which describes how IBM and SBC was enjoined and restrained, can be found on the Internet at .
3. The Prater and Wei patent, originally filed by Mobil Oil Corporation in 1960, covered a computerized spectrographic analysis technique. It had many method and apparatus claims that could be performed either on an analog or digital computer or with pencil and paper. The Prater and Wei decision on 14 August 1969, by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), is famous because the question "whether computer programs could contain patentable subject matter" was also before the CCPA.
4. Brian Randell, who served as editor for these reports, has put them on the Web: home.formal/NATONATOReports/.
5. The Johnston patent involved a machine system for the automatic record keeping of bank checks and deposits. It was a business method that bankers had always used on paper previously. While the world hoped for a landmark broad decision by the Supreme Court on software's patentability, it made a narrow decision stating that the patent did not meet the test of "unobviousness" and rejected the patent claims.
6. M. Goetz, R. Kauffman, J. Weinberg, and S. Wright, High Level Cobol Programming, Winthrop Publications, Cambridge, Mass., Feb. 1977.
7. The Flook patent involved a formula for computing variables while continuously monitoring the results, so that an alarm would be set if a predetermined limit was reached. The Supreme Court's review of this patent was its third review in six years of a patent case involving software-related issues (the two previous cases being Gottschalk vs. Benson and Dann vs. Johnston ).
8. The Diamond vs. Diehr patent case involved a computerized process for curing rubber, by determining the length of time a particular batch of rubber must remain in a molding press in order to be perfectly cured. The Supreme Court in a 5-to-4 decision ruled that an industrial process could be eligible for a patent even if it incorporated a mathematical formula or computer program.
9. "PTO Guidelines on Computer Inventions," Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C., Fall 1981.
10. Some of the articles I wrote and speeches I gave covered the Lotus vs. Borland "look and feel" copyright issue and questions that were still being asked about software's patentability.
11. M.R. Wessel, "The Real Meaning of Telex," speech, ADAPSO conference, 17 Apr. 1975.
12. By the late 1970s, it was well established that Japan was gaining market share for mainframe computers similar to its increasing market share in computer components. In IBM and the Data Processing Industry ( F. Fisher, J. McKie, and R. Manche Prager, New York, 1983), p. 430,, the authors write about Japan's interests in the late 1970s and early 80s: "The Japanese clearly intended to acquire a significant share of American computer markets, perhaps similar to their share of the US automobile market (18-20 percent). By 1980 they had captured an estimated 42 percent of the American memory market."
13. Since 1983, when IBM announced its plan to withdraw source code over a 10-year period, in public presentations, articles, and through ADAPSO, I vehemently expressed my belief that IBM's withdrawal of source code would reduce an ISV's ability to compete against IBM. When in September 1987 IBM made its source code agreement with Fujitsu, the ISPs were even more upset that IBM was selling access to its source code to a Japanese company and freezing out the ISVs. This agreement triggered ADAPSO to take aggressive actions that are discussed later on in my memoirs.
14. IBM programming announcement, "IBM OS/2 Extended Edition, V1.1," IBM Information Systems Group, Rye Brook, N.Y.,2 Apr. 1987, p. 1.
15. From 1992 though 1997, I published six articles on why OOP was not a practical method for developing enterprise applications in MIS organizations and that the ability to discover reusable code through OOP was largely a myth.
16. In 1995, Microsoft had just concluded a consent decree with the US DOJ and there was little belief then that such an agreement would curtail Microsoft. I wrote a series of articles at that time comparing how the software industry fought IBM in the 1970s and 1980s and that it was an effective way for ISVs to fight Microsoft.
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