Distributed and Managed: Research Challenges and Opportunities of the Next Generation Cyber-Physical Systems

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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems increasingly rely on distributed computing platforms where sensing, computing, actuation, and communication resources are shared by a multitude of applications. Such ‘cyber-physical cloud computing platforms’ present novel challenges because the system is built from mobile embedded devices, is inherently distributed, and typically suffers from highly fluctuating connectivity among the modules. Architecting software for these systems raises many challenges not present in traditional cloud computing. Effective management of constrained resources and application isolation without adversely affecting performance are necessary. Autonomous fault management and real-time performance requirements must be met in a verifiable manner. It is also both critical and challenging to support multiple end-users whose diverse software applications have changing demands for computational and communication resources, while operating on different levels and in separate domains of security.

The solution presented in this paper is based on a layered architecture consisting of a novel operating system, a middleware layer, and component-structured applications. The component model facilitates the construction of software applications from modular and reusable components that are deployed in the distributed system and interact only through well-defined mechanisms. The complexity of creating applications and performing system integration is mitigated through the use of a domain-specific model-driven development process that relies on a domain-specific modeling language and its accompanying graphical modeling tools, software generators for synthesizing infrastructure code, and the extensive use of model-based analysis for verification and validation.

Index Terms—distributed systems, cyber-physical systems

I. INTRODUCTION

Distributed real-time embedded systems that interact with the physical world are ubiquitous and pervasive. We are relying on an increasing number of such systems that provide services to a large number of users. Fractionated spacecraft (i.e., cluster of satellites) that performs wide-area sensing of the Earth, swarms of UAVs that survey storm damage, and the intelligent power devices that are essential for a ‘smart’ (power) grid are just a few illustrative examples for this new generation of systems. While distributed and real-time systems have been built for many decades, there are some novel properties and requirements for the engineering of such systems that we need to recognize and address.

First, we have to note that these systems are ‘cyber-physical’, that is, they interact with the physical world. Hence all software design, implementation, and verification decisions should be guided by the fact that physics imposes timing constraints on the computational and communication activities, and the implementation must obey these constraints. Furthermore, as the software system may effect changes in its physical environment these changes must verifiably satisfy safety requirements for the overall system.

Second, we have to understand that these systems are platforms. That is, they are increasingly built not as a single use, single function network, but as networked platforms that can be used by many, possibly concurrent users. The platform is relatively stable and provide common core services to all applications. However, the applications those run on the platform change fairly regularly due to software updates or because new applications have been developed. Figure 1 shows a typical node of this distributed platform on the left, along with a cloud of nodes that are communicating via a network where at least one of the nodes has a communication link to a control node. Nodes can join and leave the cloud during operation.

Third, these systems are used for distributed applications. Applications typically span multiple nodes, for reasons related to the availability of resources: some nodes may have sensors, some may have actuators, some may have the computing or storage resources, some applications need more than the processing power available on one node. Therefore, applications that use these resources have to be architected such that they rely on loosely connected, interacting components, running on different processors. Applications can be organically
assembled from components that provide specific services, and components may be used (or re-used) by many active applications. Obviously, the cluster of computing nodes runs many applications concurrently.

Fourth, the platform is often a critical resource - possibly a societal system, whose use must be carefully monitored and controlled by a responsible owner. Therefore, these systems are managed by some authority. Furthermore, as the platform can be used and shared by many applications, possibly originating from different organizations, the platform and thus the system needs to be actively managed to avoid ‘tragedy of the commons’ type failures. Additionally, because of the embedded nature of the system, deployment and control of applications need to ensure that the systems’ (often scarce) resources are provisioned.

Fifth, security cannot be an afterthought. Information flows in general and access to shared resources in particular should be controlled under some overarching security policy. For instance, high quality, sensitive customer data (from the electric grid) cannot be made available to untrusted applications that are supplied by parties needing access to derived data containing daily averages only – and those applications should not have any means to access that high-grade, sensitive data. Furthermore, applications supplied by users cannot be trusted, and the platform must protect itself from abuse by such applications. If multiple applications run on the platform concurrently, and there is a need for some degree of data sharing among the applications, the platform must permit that while enforcing the security policies defined for the system.

Sixth, resilience is essential. Anything can go wrong at any time: faults in the computing and communication hardware, in the platform, in the application software. Moreover unanticipated changes in the system (erroneous updates) or in the environment must be survivable and the system should recover. The system here includes both the platform, as well as the distributed applications.

Reading the above list one might argue that existing cloud computing platforms based on virtualization technologies already provide a solution for all these requirements. However, this is not the case for the following reasons. Existing cloud computing platforms were not designed with the requirements of real-time embedded systems, where operating under resource constraints and timing requirements are essential. The distributed applications here need not only scale, but to also satisfy timing and security requirements. Interactions with physical devices (sensor, actuators, special purpose hardware) is rarely an issue in conventional cloud computing platforms – everything is virtualized, without consideration for the management of resources that are part of the system but not the computing platform. It appears that current cloud computing platforms are not prepared for mission critical real-time embedded systems, in general.

Arguably, the challenges listed above define a new a category of systems that is emerging today. In this paper we present some initial ideas and relevant research questions that will hopefully be addressed by the research community. The next section discusses the issues of an overall architecture for such systems. The section following discusses the needs for a development toolsuite, which is followed by a section on some initial results. A review of relevant related work is followed by a summary and conclusions.

II. PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE

We aim at building a reusable software platform that can be applied across many application domains, and many processing and communication platforms. The software platform should provide solutions to core resource management problems, support security, and provide services that are application independent.

This platform can be built as a multi-layer architecture that addresses these issues, as shown on Fig 2. At the lowest level, an operating system kernel provides the core resource sharing and management functions, as well as the isolation from hardware specific details. The kernel is typically accessed via ‘system libraries’ that provide a convenient interface to kernel services. Layered upon this foundation there is a middleware layer to provide higher-level, reusable communication (i.e. messaging) and resource management services. The next layer up provides the component abstractions, in order to support component-oriented development or distributed applications. The platform should provide services for application configuration and lifecycle management (the deployment manager), for application control (the mission manager), for the handling of faults arising during operations (the fault manager), and for the management of resources (the resource manager). Note that by ‘managers’ here we mean critical, privileged applications that run outside of the core operating system, and provide complex and long-term management services.

Note that a layered architecture helps with establishing assurances for the overall systems. At the bottom, the hardware layer provides guarantees about correct behavior (that was
verified by the hardware vendor). The kernel can assume these and provide its own guarantees to the higher layers that, in turn, provide their guarantees to the higher layers, etc.

A. Platform kernel

At the lowest layer of the software platform, the kernel encapsulates device drivers and provides processor scheduling and networking features, but it also needs to address the real-time, resilience, and security requirements of the application domain. Borrowing language from the computer security community, the kernel has to be part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that provides guarantees and is built and verified to high-assurance standards [1].

Real-time requirements can be addressed by a number of factors. Interrupt latencies (i.e. the worst-case delay elapsed between the arrival of an interrupt and the release of an activity the responds to that interrupt) should be bounded and known. System calls should always be configurally time-bounded, and should return with a timeout error in case of unexpected delays to prevent the caller application from being unacceptably delayed. The kernel should support a number of scheduling policies that provide verifiable guarantees for the time of task execution. Furthermore, it should allow application tasks of different criticality levels to share the CPU. All tasks of an application should run at the same criticality level and this should be reflected in the available scheduling policies. Because of the often critical nature of the applications, the scheduling models provided by the kernel must support timing analysis.

Schedulability analysis is very problematic in the most general case, with completely unconstrained task behaviors. However, it can become feasible when restrictions are placed on the behavior of and the interaction amongst the tasks. As discussed below, an application-level software component model can provide such restrictions, such that the component-level schedulability becomes manageable. However, the kernel should be kept simple and provide only core scheduling services that support potentially many component models. According to experience, tasks should be able to operate within a shared address space (i.e. threads) as well as separated address spaces (i.e. processes). Finally, the kernel scheduler should be able to take advantage of multi-core architectures and be able to schedule tasks on different cores, possibly under application control.

Communication links in a distributed system are a critical resource, especially when they are scarce and highly dynamic, as in mobile ad-hoc networks. Hence the communication facilities, including the protocol stack, should be implemented accordingly. As a minimum, the kernel should support a multitude of transport protocols, preferably above a common network protocol.

Real-time support must be available for the communications as well. Datagrams (message blocks) should be time stamped by the kernel such that message recipients are aware of the message transfer delays. This necessitates clock synchronization across the nodes; IEEE or IEEE 802.1AS can serve as the facility to support that. Furthermore, the network layer should support time-constrained real-time communications with guarantees. For some classes of network traffic existing best-effort approaches (like TCP/IP) are insufficient, and real-time protocols are needed. The solution here necessitates a multitude of network traffic classes, including sporadic but highly critical traffic, guaranteed-bandwidth time triggered traffic, rate constrained traffic, and best effort traffic\(^1\). The kernel, as the ultimate resource manager is to support the sharing of the communication link(s) and is to permit applications to select the traffic classes needed for their specific network flows. Furthermore, if the communication channel is not able to provide the expected performance anymore the kernel should signal the application so that it can adapt to this change.

Security (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity) of communications is a critical issue in some of the application domains. On the lowest layers, features for secure communication should be available, possibly supported by the communication hardware itself and cryptography engines. However, as the applications running on the platform are not necessarily trusted, their communication capabilities need to be constrained as well. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) with Multi Level Security (MLS) [2] on the network and the messages may be necessary, in which case the kernel has to provide support for (1) the trustworthy configuration of network communications and (2) labeled communications between parties. The first means that only privileged, trusted service processes are permitted to configure the network and the communication flows in the network. We expect that untrusted processes are not permitted to simply open a communication channel to the network and talk to any network address – only trusted service processes can create the network connections, and once initiated the communication endpoints are handed over to the untrusted processes for use. The second means that, following the principles of labeled communications, each message transmitter and receiver is provided with a label set, by an external authority. These labels are to be used in each communication operation by the application, and their correct use is validated and enforced by the TCB. Note that while these technologies have been originally developed for government applications, security awareness on a shared computing platform necessitates their use.

A communication flow is valid only between parties with labels that satisfy the rule that information can flow only from lower to higher or between equal labels (according to the domination relation). Assuming an increasing order of sensitivity: Confidential < CompetitionSensitive < ManagementOnly, e.g., a CompetitionSensitive process for mission A can read Confidential or CompetitionSensitive data for mission A, but not ManagementOnly data for mission A or CompetitionSensitive data for mission B. When the transmitter wishes to transfer a message, it has to supply a

\(^1\)The standard SAE AS6802: Time-Triggered Ethernet has similar traffic classes.
message label that must match with one of the labels in its own set, and satisfies the MLS rule. The kernel, which is part of the TCB, performs this check on each message – both on the transmitter and the receiver side. This machinery can ensure that processes always follow the communication constraints defined by a security policy.

The operating system runs processes; both application and service processes. To distinguish between these a capability mechanism is needed that controls what operating system services a process can use. For example, in order to prevent the unchecked proliferation of application processes, only privileged processes should be permitted to create new processes. When a process is created, its parent process should specify what capabilities the child has, which can only be a subset of the capabilities of the parent.

B. Platform services

As mentioned above, platform services are needed to perform management functions on the running system that are outside of the scope of typical applications. Note that platform services perform critical functions that require privileges, hence the platform services are part of the TCB. We envision at least four kinds of management services:

Deployment management: As stated in the introduction, the envisioned systems are managed by some management authority, presumably over a network connection. Each node in the system has to have a service that can download, install, configure, activate, tear down, and remove the distributed applications. This service is essentially the top-level configuration manager for the node. Note that it itself should be fault-tolerant (i.e., able to manage faults during the deployment process), should obey and enforce security policies, and should be responsive (per real-time requirements).

Mission management: Beyond deployment, there is a need for a service to manage the execution of applications. One should be able to activate and de-activate applications based on triggering events or the elapse of time. Triggering events can be generated by applications or the services. Mission management should include support for system auditing (including logging control) and debugging.

Fault management: Resilience to faults is a core requirement for the system. We envision that the fault management is autonomous: the system attempts to restore functionality, if possible, without external intervention. Obviously, it may be necessary that the system cannot manage a fault on its own, and it has to contact its management authority. While fault management is inherently a shared responsibility of all layers (including applications), there are some system-level issues that can be addressed by a dedicated service. For instance, if an application unexpectedly terminates, a fault management reaction could be an attempt to restart the application, and if that fails then attempt to restart the application on another node, the capability facilitated by a fault management service. Note that the software platform is not to define fixed policies for fault management (e.g., try restart five times, then re-allocate), rather it is to provide mechanisms that allow implementing any such policies (e.g., by scripting the behavior of the fault manager service).

Resource management: Embedded systems are typically resource constrained, hence unbounded resource usage cannot be permitted. This can be strictly managed by a static quota system, where developers declare the resource needs of their applications, then a system integrator verifies that such resource needs are acceptable (i.e., the application is ‘admissible’), and then the software platform enforces these quotas. If the application attempts to obtain more resources than it was declared, the request will fail (and the application has to handle this failure). This method is too strict, however, and may use resources very inefficiently. A resource manager service can implement a more complex, dynamic resource allocation policy, where applications can dynamically request and release resources, and the service honors or rejects these requests while maximizing system utility. Note that a critical resource is network bandwidth (if it is limited and/or fluctuating), and the dynamic management of communication bandwidth that maximizes system utility is a challenge.

C. Middleware

All modern distributed software systems are built using middleware libraries that provide core communication abstractions for object-based systems. These abstractions are to facilitate prototypical component interactions. Industry standards and pragmatic experience shows that a well-defined, small set of interaction patterns can provide a solid foundation for building applications. The set includes: (1) Point-to-point interactions when when an object wants to invoke specific services of another object. The interaction can be synchronous (call-return) or asynchronous (call-callback). Note that the client and server are coupled and are involved in bi-directional messaging. (2) Publish-subscribe interactions when a publisher generates data samples, which are then asynchronously consumed by interested subscribers. Note that the publishers are loosely coupled, and not directly known to each other. While additional, more complex interactions may also be needed, the interactions should be facilitated in conjunction with overall system requirements. For instance, the interactions can be subject to timing constraints, and the scheduling of the message exchanges should be done accordingly. The interactions are also subject to the security policies - only permitted information flows can be utilized to facilitate an interaction. The interactions have to be implemented in conjunction with the fault management architecture: objects participating in the interactions must become aware of faults (originating from the network, for instance), and should be able to rely on fault tolerant services, if available.

D. Component model

We envision a component-oriented software development for the platform. Obviously, this necessitates a precisely defined abstract component model that helps developers to build robust systems from reusable components. The implementation of the component model must rely on a robust component
framework that facilitates and mediates all interactions among the components. The component model should clearly define how component activities are scheduled, based on events or the elapse of time, and what the component lifecycle is.

The component model is subject to all requirements mentioned above. It has to support real-time requirements: we want to be able to predict the timing properties of the system based on the timing properties of the components and their specific interactions. The component model should support security policies, and should provide for fault management, including anomaly detection, diagnosis, and fault mitigation.

III. DEVELOPMENT TOOLS

Developing code for modern software platforms (e.g. Android or iOS) cannot be done without sophisticated tool support. This issue is compounded by the complexity of distributed systems, where not only code development has to be done, but also complex configuration and allocation decisions have to be made and implemented.

As discussed above, the platform supports a component model with complex interaction semantics. Coding for such a component model by hand is quite difficult and error prone, hence higher-level abstractions, such as models, are needed. There is a need for a modeling language specific for the component model that is easy to use and mitigates accidental complexity. Furthermore, the modeling language should facilitate the composition of applications from components. As we are building a distributed system, the models should also encompass the (static or dynamic) configuration of the network with computing nodes and communication links. Many cross-cutting aspects, like resource quotas, fault management strategies, security labels for secure communications, etc. should also be represented. Finally, the allocation of applications to computing nodes and information flows to network links should also be modeled, either explicitly (to support static allocation) or implicitly (to support dynamic allocation).

In summary, we envision a wide-spectrum domain-specific modeling language that covers all of the above areas. General purpose modeling languages (e.g. UML) or their specializations (e.g. MARTE) solve only part of the problem, and often in a somewhat cumbersome way, e.g. using stereotypes. Arguably, a dedicated, platform-specific modeling language is a better approach.

The development toolchain should be able to support both conventional (code-oriented) and model-based development of software components. The first one is needed for general purpose components, while the second one opens up the opportunity to use the results of model-based development tools (like Simulink/Stateflow). Tool integration to ensure semantic interoperability across development tools is essential.

Finally, the development tools should include tools for checking the correctness of the modeled applications and analyzing system properties including schedulability and the ability to compare alternative deployment strategies.

IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS

DREMS\(^2\) is a software infrastructure for designing, implementing, configuring, deploying and managing distributed real-time embedded systems that consists of two major subsystems: (1) a design-time toolsuite for modeling, analysis, synthesis, implementation, debugging, testing, and maintenance of application software built from reusable components, and (2) a run-time software platform for deploying, managing, and operating application software on a network of computing nodes. The platform is tailored towards a managed network of computers and distributed software applications running on that network of nodes, i.e. a cluster.

The toolsuite supports a model-based paradigm of software development for distributed, real-time, embedded systems where modeling tools and generators automate the tedious parts of software development and also provide a design-time framework for the analysis of software systems. The runtime software platform reduces the complexity and increases the reliability of software applications by providing reusable technological building blocks in the form of an operating system, middleware, and application management services.

A. DREMS Architecture

DREMS is a complete, end-to-end solution for software development: from modeling tools to code to deployed applications. It is open and extensible, and relies on open industry standards, well-tested functionality and high-performance tools. It focuses on the architectural issues of the software, and promotes the modeling of application software, where the models are directly used in the construction of the software.

Software applications running on the DREMS platform are distributed: an application consists of one or more actors that run in parallel, typically on different nodes of a network. Actors specialize the concept of processes: they have identity with state, can be migrated from node to node. Actors are created, deployed, configured, and managed by a special service of the run-time platform: the deployment manager - a privileged, distributed, and fault tolerant actor, present on each node of the system, that performs all management functions for application actors. An actor can also be assigned a set of limited resources of the node on which it runs: memory and file space, a share of CPU time, and a share of the network bandwidth.

Applications are built from software components - hosted by actors - that only interact via well-defined interaction patterns using security-labeled messages, and are allowed to use specific sets of services provided by the operating system, including messaging and thread synchronization operations. Note that components use these indirectly: via the middleware.

The middleware libraries implement the high-level communication abstractions: synchronous and asynchronous interactions, on top of the low-level services provided by the underlying distributed hardware platform. Interaction patterns include (1) point-to-point interactions (in the form of synchronous and asynchronous remote method invocations), and

\(^2\)http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/drems
implement the conventional support services
and libstdcpp
These extensions are in the form of 120+ new system calls.
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in the Linux kernel (currently: version 3.2.17). This permits
of specific services, but it strongly relies on the code available
operating system layer extends the Linux kernel with a number
proven open-source technology. Starting from the bottom, the
several layers. Practically all layers are based on existing and

B. Run-time Software Platform

The implementation of the run-time software platform has
several layers. Practically all layers are based on existing and
proven open-source technology. Starting from the bottom, the
operating system layer extends the Linux kernel with a number
of specific services, but it strongly relies on the code available
in the Linux kernel (currently: version 3.2.17). This permits
the use of DREMS services for the actors, but also keeps the
Linux system calls for debugging and monitoring purposes.
These extensions are in the form of 120+ new system calls.

The C and C++ run-time support libraries (based on uClibc\textsuperscript{3}
and libstdc++\textsuperscript{4} implement the conventional support services
needed by the typical C and C++ programs. The C run-time
library has entry points to access the DREMS OS system
calls. These calls utilize data structures that have been defined
using the standard OMG Interface Definition Language
(IDL), and can be created and manipulated using generated
constructor and manipulation operators. The implementation
of the DREMS operating system calls checks the integrity
of all data structures passed on the interface. This enables
validation of the data structures on the interface, preventing
potential abuse of the system calls.

Layered on the C and C++ run-time libraries the Adaptive
Communication Environment (ACE) libraries provide a
low-overhead isolation layer for the higher level middleware

\textsuperscript{3}www.uclibc.org
\textsuperscript{4}http://gcc.gnu.org/libstdc++/

elements that support CORBA and DDS. The CORBA implementa-
tion is based on The ACE ORB (TAO, currently: version
6.1.4) that implements a subset of the CORBA standard
for facilitating point-to-point interactions between distributed
objects. Such interactions are in the form of Remote Method
Invocations (RMIs) or Asynchronous Method Invocations
(AMIs). RMIs follow the call-return semantics, where the
caller waits until the server responds, while the AMIs follow
the call-return-callback semantics, where the caller continues
immediately and the response from the server is handled by a
registered callback operation of the client. The CORBA subset
implemented by the middleware has been selected to support
a minimal set of core functions that are suitable for resource-
constrained embedded systems. The DDS implementation
is based on the OpenDDS (currently: version 3.4) that imple-
ments a subset of the DDS standard for facilitating anony-
mous publish/subscribe interactions among distributed objects.
There are several quality-of-service attributes associated with
publishers and subscribers that control features like buffering,
reliability, delivery rate, etc. DDS is designed to be highly
scalable, and its implementations meet the requirements of
mission-critical applications.

CORBA and DDS provide for data exchange and basic
interactions between distributed objects, but in DREMS ob-
jects are packaged into higher-level units called components.
A component \cite{3} publishes and subscribes to various topics
(possibly many), implements (provides) interface(s), and ex-
pects (requires) implementations of other interfaces. Note that
a component may contain several, tightly coupled objects.
Components may expose parts of their observable state via
read-only state variables, accessible through specific methods.
Components are configured via configurable parameters. Their
operations are scheduled based on events or elapse of time.
An event can be the arrival of a message the component
has subscribed to or an incoming request on a provided
interface. Time triggering is done by associating a timer
with the component that invokes a selected operation on
the component when a set amount of time elapses, possibly
periodically repeating the operation. Component operations
can perform computations, publish messages, and call out
to other components via the required interfaces. To avoid
having to write complex locking and synchronization logic for
components, component operations are always single threaded:
inside of one component at most one thread can be active at
any time. Actors are formed from interacting components, and
applications are formed from actors that interact with each
other via their interacting components. Actors (together with
their components) can be deployed on different nodes of a
network, but their composition and interactions are always
clearly defined: they must happen either via remote method
invocations or via publish/subscribe interactions.

Figure 3 shows an application where a Sensor component
periodically (P) publishes a message that a GPS component
subscribes to, and which, in turn, sporadically (S) publishes
another message that a NAvDispaly component consumes.
This last component invokes the GPS component via a pro-
RMI interaction

hardware platform are also modeled, as the mapping of actors etc. Finally, the deployment of the application(s) on the processors, network and device interfaces, network addresses,Additionally, the hardware platform for the cluster are modeled:
terms interacting components and actors containing them). Ad-
implementations, component assemblies, and applications (in
terface and publish/subscribe message types), component
interface and message types, components types (in terms

textual models various properties of the application, including:
interface and message types, components types (in terms
interfaces and publish/subscribe message types), component
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terms interacting components and actors containing them). Ad-
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processors, network and device interfaces, network addresses,
etc. Finally, the deployment of the application(s) on the
hardware platform are also modeled, as the mapping of actors

Fig. 3: Component-based distributed system example

provided interface, when it needs to refresh its own state. The
messages published can be quite small, while the method
invocation (that happens less frequently, and on demand) may
transfer larger amounts of data.

The run-time software platform includes a key platform
actor: the Deployment Manager (DM) that instantiates, con-
figures, activates, deactivates, and dismantles applications.
Every node on a network has a copy of the DM that acts
as a controller for all applications on that node. The DMs
communicate with each other, with one being the lead ‘clus-
ter’ DM. This, cluster leader orchestrates the deployment of
applications across cluster with the help of the node DMs. For
development, the binaries of application components should be
installed on each node, then the cluster lead DM is provided
a deployment plan that is generated from application models
and executes the plan, coordinating the activities of node level
DMs which start the actors, installs components, configures the
network connections among the components, etc., and finally
activates the components. This last step releases the execution
threads of the components. When the applications need to
be removed, the DM stops the components, withdraws the
network configuration, and stops the actors. A key feature of
the deployment process is that the network connections
among the parts: i.e. actors and components of the distributed
application are managed: the application business logic does
not have to deal with this problem; everything is set up based
on the deployment plan.

C. Design-time Development Platform

Configuring the middleware and writing code that takes
advantage of the component framework is a highly non-trivial
and tedious task. To mitigate this problem and to enable
programmer productivity, a model-driven development envi-
ronment is available that simplifies the tasks of the application
developers and system integrators.

In this environment, developers define via graphical and
textual models various properties of the application, including:
interface and message types, components types (in terms
interfaces and publish/subscribe message types), component
implementations, component assemblies, and applications (in
terms interacting components and actors containing them). Ad-
ditionally, the hardware platform for the cluster are modeled:
processors, network and device interfaces, network addresses,
etc. Finally, the deployment of the application(s) on the
hardware platform are also modeled, as the mapping of actors
onto hardware nodes, and information flows onto network
links. Models are processed by code generators that produce
several artifacts from them: source code, configuration files,
built system artifacts that facilitate the automated compilation
and linking of the components, and other documents. The
application developer is expected to provide the component
implementation code in the form of C++ code (currently, in
the future: any other, supported executable language) and add
it to the generated code. The compilation and debugging of
the applications can happen with the help of a conventional
development environment (currently: Eclipse) that supports
editing, compiling, and debugging the code. The result of this
process is a set of component executables and the deployment
plan - ready to be deployed on a cluster of nodes.

The model-driven approach has several benefits. (1) The
model serves as the single source of all structural and con-
figuration information for the system. (2) The tedious work
of crafting middleware ‘glue’ code and configuration files for
deployment is automated: everything is derived programm-
atically from the models. (3) The models provide an explicit
representation of the architecture of all the applications run-
ning on the system - this enables architectural and performance
analysis on the system before it is executed. (4) Models can
also be used for rapidly creating ‘mockup’ components and
applications for rapid prototyping and evaluation.

D. Example: Cluster flight control and sensor processing

We have evaluated the DREMS prototype on several exam-
pies. The graphical modeling tool runs on Windows, the code
development and cross-compilation tools on a Linux platform,
while DREMS is on a set of networked embedded x86-
based devices (3 iBX-530 industrial computers). Deployment
and configuration is done from the Linux machine, via the
network. Several small scale tests were used to validate that
the platform is functional. A more realistic application involved
a distributed flight control software applications (2 actors on
each node, with 3-4 components each), and a sensor processing
application (dissimilar actors on each node). The flight con-
trol actors share critical, but low-bandwidth data, the sensor
application shares high bandwidth, but low criticality data.
The two sets of applications run in different security domains,
and in different temporal partitions. We were scheduling the
applications in partitions of 100 msec duration, and were
experimenting with variable bandwidth between the nodes. All
designed and implemented features were functional, including
component interactions, partition scheduling, security labeling
and information flow separation, application deployment and
control. The applications have been constructed using the
model-driven development toolchain; the model had about
100 distinct elements. Component code was hand inserted
into the skeleton code generated by the software generators,
followed by compilation using Eclipse with a cross-compiler
for the platform. The model-driven generation produced all
the infrastructure code, simplifying the task of the developer.
A detailed report of these experiments can be found in [4].
V. RELATED WORK

There are several architecture description languages for embedded systems, including the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [5], SysML [6] and the Modeling and Analysis of Realtime and Embedded (MARTE) [7] systems profile for UML. These are general purpose modeling languages that can be used across a wide variety of systems. Because of specific features that are tightly integrated into our system, such as security labels and partition scheduling, we designed a dedicated domain-specific modeling language to describe DREMS systems and applications. However, automated transformation from our modeling language to these general purpose languages is possible and may be used to leverage some of their analysis capabilities.

A similar toolsuite that also uses a domain-specific approach for component-based systems is described in [8]. That work focuses primarily on support for highly dynamic environments that require adaptation, and hence their environment supports dynamic updating and reconfiguration of models based on feedback from the running system. The biggest differences between that work and DREMS are that DREMS supports multiple messaging semantics and has built-in support for security in both the kernel and middleware layers.

Our previous work in modeling component-based systems includes the CoSMIC [9], [10] tool suite, which assists with the model-based development, configuration and deployment of CORBA Component Model-based applications. While DREMS is more extensive than CoSMIC and provides the ability to model elements like hardware and task schedules, experience from the CoSMIC project helped guide certain design aspects of component modeling inside DREMS.

The ARINC-653 Component Model (ACM) [11], which implements a component model for the ARINC-653 standard [12] for avionics computing, forms the basis for the DREMS component model. DREMS extends the temporal partitioning scheduling method used by ACM by allowing multiple actors (processes) per temporal partition, a valuable feature for components that interact through synchronous messages. Further, the DREMS component model is designed to promote deadlock/race condition-free behavior in components.

The secure transport feature of DREMS is based on multi-level security (MLS) [2]. All messages have a security label and must obey a set of mandatory access control (MAC) policies. The main novelty in DREMS with respect to MLS is the concept of multi-domain labels [13] to support secure policies. The main novelty in DREMS with respect to MLS and must obey a set of mandatory access control (MAC) level security (MLS) [2]. All messages have a security label.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

DREMS is a prototype, end-to-end solution for building and running distributed real-time embedded applications. It contains not only a run-time framework with a state-of-the-art operating system extended with special features for resource, application, and network management together with a component framework with a precisely defined model of computation, but also a model-driven development toolchain that assists developers and integrators in managing the development process.

But DREMS is only a partial prototype for a class of software platforms outlined in the first two sections. We believe that such software platforms are essential for implementing the next generation of distributed real-time embedded systems. Embedded systems are not black boxes anymore, but rather platforms with an evolving and dynamically changing software ecosystem.

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