Measuring Privacy Disclosures in URL Query Strings

URLs often utilize query strings — that is, key-value pairs appended to the URL path — to pass session parameters and form data. The URL http://www.ex.com/path/to/content.php?key1=val1&key2=val2, for example, has a query string with two key-value pairs. Although often benign and necessary to render the Web page, query strings sometimes contain tracking mechanisms, usernames, email addresses, and other information that users might not wish to publicly reveal.

In isolation, URL privacy is of minimal concern; at most, it leaves users susceptible to physical over-the-shoulder observation, or shoulder-surfing attacks. However, the problem is massively exacerbated when URLs are shared and published online. The URL and the sensitive data contained within it then become available to marketers, spammers harvesting contact information, and cybercriminals with nefarious intentions. It comes as no surprise that many URLs end up on the public Web, in no small part due to a Web 2.0 culture increasingly characterized by social networking and information sharing. Moreover, because many posting environments are profile driven, a history of contributions could reveal considerable private user data. Additionally, query strings can be exposed in man-in-the-middle attacks unless HTTPS is used to encrypt server requests.

We argue that published URLs have a significant and prevalent impact on user privacy, an issue that has yet to be studied in depth (see the “Related Work in URL Security” sidebar). As we describe here, our argument is supported by a measurement study of more than 892 million user-submitted URLs. We further contend that social platforms have been insufficient in curbing these leaks, despite being intuitive locales for privacy-preserving logic. To address this deficiency, we propose a...
Finding and Measuring Sensitive URLs

To demonstrate the privacy concerns of query strings, we obtained a large URL corpus from an industry partner with access to a large quantity of URLs submitted directly by users. Because this partner service eases link tracking and handling, many submitted links are later found on Web 2.0 social and collaborative services. Thus, sensitive query string information is likely to find itself in the semi-public domain where it can be harvested by peers, marketers, or cybercriminals.

Our URL set consists of 892 million URLs, 490 million (54.9 percent) of which have one or more key-value pairs (see Table 1). Approximately 5 percent of the URLs have more than five pairs, and more than 23,000 URLs have more than 100 (see Figure 1). In all, the set has roughly 909,000 unique key labels producing 1.3 billion total key-value pairs.

Figure 2’s word cloud visualizes the most common keys in the data. Leading the way is the key utm_source, with 128.5 million instances in 14 percent of all addresses. The utm_source key is used to monitor referrers and traffic campaigns, as are seven of the 10 most popular keys and all of those prefixed by “utm” (for the Urchin Tracking Model, which offers a structured way to track links and has

References

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### Table 1. Keys with privacy ramifications that have more than 100,000 occurrences*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Keys</th>
<th>Total occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total URLs</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>892,934,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URLs w/keys</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>490,227,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referrer data</td>
<td>utm_source, ref, trackerc, referrer, source, src, sentFrom, referralSource, referral_source</td>
<td>259,490,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic location</td>
<td>my_lat, my_lon, zip, country, coordinate, hours_offset, address</td>
<td>5,961,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network properties</td>
<td>ul_speed, dl_speed, network_name, mobile</td>
<td>3,824,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online identity</td>
<td>uname, user_email, email, user_id, user, login_account_id</td>
<td>2,142,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>login_password, pwd</td>
<td>672,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal identity</td>
<td>name1, name2, gender</td>
<td>533,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>phone</td>
<td>56,267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not every value associated with these keys is privacy revealing; we use Monte Carlo sampling to confidently determine that at least a majority of values match an expected format.

become widespread due to its integration into the Google Analytics platform). In contrast, many keys are ambiguous in meaning or used by specific Web platforms without an obvious naming convention. Single-letter keys are common, for example, as are those that build around the id key.

### Key-Driven Manual Analysis

The bulk of query strings are uninteresting, serving as opaque identifiers or benign session parameters. More interesting are those that reveal personal information, such as the identity and location of whomever visited and subsequently shared a URL. At this point, we don’t concern ourselves with whether these sensitive key-value pairs are intended or crucial to page rendering, only that they’re present within the URL.

To find sensitive pairs, we first manually inspect the 861 keys with more than 100,000 occurrences; Table 1 shows the interesting findings grouped thematically. Although key names often indicate use cases, we also surveyed their values to confirm that sensitive data is present. For example, we want to confirm that zip keys usually have five-digit numerical values. With the exception of the “authentication” category, plaintext and human-readable values are the norm. Thus, as Table 1 shows, considerable personal information is potentially leaked via published URLs. In some ways, this table underreports the risks. For example, the key email appears 103,000 times, but there are 637,000 pairs in which the key matches the pattern *email* and 1.7 million email addresses in the corpus based on a pattern match over values.

In any case, we must be careful about such claims because we can’t know to what extent values are “personal.” Geographic coordinates in a URL could be referencing a user’s exact location or be centering a map application over a landmark. Given the ethical considerations, we don’t attempt to validate any of the mined personal information. This is particularly relevant when handling authentication credentials. Fortunately, when password or its analogues are present, the values are almost always encrypted or hashed following best practices (such as adding random “salting” values to limit hash-to-hash comparisons). Accordingly, the MD5 and SHA hashes of 100 common passwords matched no corpus values. Unfortunately, isolated examples arise of full credentials being passed in plaintext via a query string (our shallow search found several dozen). In the two most egregious examples, the credentials to an admin account were
revealed, and the user/password were shown for a site serving extremely personal information. Such situations are interesting smoking-gun examples, but the sensitivities surrounding these URLs are such that they can’t be published without significant redaction (such as https://www.●.com/index.aspx?accountname=●&username=●&password=●).

Value-Driven Autonomous Searching
A key-driven search for sensitive data has shortcomings. Manual efforts limit the depth to which labeling can occur, and the process relies on hosts and applications adhering to nonstandardized naming conventions. An alternate means of study is to analyze the values themselves for privacy leaks.

For example, credit-card numbers are self-verifiable in that they have an expected length, established prefixes, and checksum via Luhn’s algorithm.3 Our search found 93,420 values that matched these criteria, but these were distributed across many key labels. We’re confident these are opaque numerical identifiers; when aggregated by key (and subsequently by key and domain), no key’s full value set had more criteria-matching values than probable over a set of random values. Other values have a constrained and expected format, such as dates of birth. We identified nearly two million such dates, but it was ambiguous whether the dates were referencing personal information or an alternative data point (nearly all reside under the broad date key). Lastly, other values have an expected distribution. Value-first searching for four-digit numerical values yielded the keys pinid, pno, and customid, whose names are evocative of banking or confirmation PINs. However, when the distributions of these numbers were plotted, they were entirely inconsistent with prior research into user-selected values of this type.4 In this manner, value-first analysis let us eliminate a potential privacy disclosure vector.

Although not particularly fruitful over our corpus, we believe the value-first methodology is the preferred means to uncover these types of data points, if they’re present.

Value Entropy
In addition to data mining values to find private data, we found that the higher-level diversity or entropy metric of a key’s value set was also helpful. A key that is used in a binary fashion will have few unique values and low entropy. Even if this information were personal, such as via the gender key, it doesn’t reveal a terrible amount about the user in question (a random guess would often be correct). In contrast, high entropy keys have so many unique values that they can describe very specific properties toward identifying an individual.

We compute a diversity ($d$) measure that lies on [0,1] by dividing the number of unique values in a key’s value list by the magnitude of that list; Figure 3a shows $d$’s distribution over popular keys. Most keys have low entropy, including the most popular key, utm_source (Figure 3b plots its distribution). Fewer than 10 unique values constitute a majority of that key’s occurrences, led by values twitterfeed (self-explanatory; 26 percent of all values) and share_petition (from change.org; 7.5 percent of values).

Contrast Figure 3b’s distribution (noting the differing log scales) with that of Figure 3c showing the key secureCode, which is used for confirming account creations and mailing list subscriptions. As with secureCode, we find that most of the (interesting and privacy-relevant) keys we identify in Table 1 lie on $0.33 < d < 0.66$. Examples of these keys include user (0.53), email (0.49), and my_lat + my_lon (both 0.38).

That being said, many keys in this space don’t appear to have privacy implications. Instead, the range contains a significantly reduced number of keys (per Figure 3a) over which human analysts or complex computational methods can operate.
RESTful URLs

Proponents of RESTful URLs\textsuperscript{5} believe that query strings decrease URL usability and accessibility. Instead, they advocate for embedding parameters directly onto the URL path, thereby making the path a potential location for private data. In our study, RESTful URLs weren’t uncommon when dealing with host- or application-specific data (such as product identifiers). However, as it pertains to client data — whose privacy we’re concerned with — RESTful URLs appear to be a minute portion of the problem space. The query string key \texttt{zip} has 270,000 appearances in our corpus, but searching for */zip/[5-digits]/ in URL paths yielded just 252 results (0.093 percent as frequent). We found similar results with other keys from Table 1, justifying our choice to give RESTful URLs no further attention moving forward.

URL and Contributor Metadata

Our data source provides minimal information about those who contribute links, but does monitor user-agent and geolocation data for users who click those links. Although traffic quantification is still straightforward, our ability to learn about a contributor’s location and device type is limited. However, we can gain insight from 5.3 million cases in which we use an encrypted client identifier to join the “contributor” and “click-through” datasets — which are precisely those cases in which users test their contribution soon after its creation.

Traffic to Sensitive URLs

In the interest of efficiency, we monitored a single day’s sample of contributed URLs for click traffic in the subsequent month. Approximately 12 percent of those 19 million URLs saw at least one click, and there were 103 million aggregate clicks in this interval. Many of our data partner’s URLs are contributed in bulk by automated agents, and not all URLs are used in a timely manner, if at all. The lack of traffic to many links shouldn’t be a point of emphasis; a relative interpretation of Figure 4 is more significant. We could have discarded automated submissions using metadata supplied by our data provider, but we contend such contributions are an interesting portion of the URL-sharing ecosystem.

Figure 4 shows that the traffic at links with a query string tracks closely with that of all URLs (approximately 12 percent having one or more views). Far less viewed are links that exhibit the most acute privacy concerns (with just 1.1 percent having one or more views). This isn’t entirely surprising: these hosts/applications are ignoring best practices, which likely speaks to the quality and popularity of their entire operation. Although this is seemingly a triumph for user privacy, realize that harvesters and criminals don’t need to actually visit a link to obtain private data — they simply need to know of its existence.

Geographical Considerations

Table 2 provides a breakdown of contribution quantity and query string statistics by country. Query string presence shows statistically significant variance between nations of plus or minus 20 percent off the 60 percent mean. One anomaly is Korea’s 4.7 percent rate of sensitive disclosures.
Further investigation revealed this was due to a popular mobile messaging client that included a user key; fortunately, this parameter didn’t map to individual usernames, but seemed to fulfill a more administrative function.

**Role of Mobile Devices**

Leveraging user-agent strings lets us determine whether a URL contributor is using a mobile device. Recalling that our data-joining methodology presumably excludes many automated clients, we found 22 percent of contributions to be mobile in nature. In this set, 63 percent of mobile contributions have query strings, compared to just 38 percent from non-mobile machines. This seems to indicate that either

- mobile users view and share fundamentally different content, or
- non-mobile users are manually performing URL sanitization, a task that might be difficult for mobile users given small screen sizes, awkward keyboards, and so on.

In fact, 40 percent of all “sensitive” URLs come from mobile devices, even though they compose just 22 percent of the broader set.

**Privacy-Enhanced URL Sharing**

To reduce privacy disclosures via URL query strings, we propose CleanURL, a system that uses back-end logic to determine both the necessity and sensitivity of key-value pairs. The system’s output is a sanitized URL that is graphically presented to users for confirmation or modification. For complete details, see our technical report.

**Argument Removal Logic**

When attempting to sanitize a URL, we must first assess each key-value pair’s sensitivity (whether the value contains private data) and its necessity (whether the page content renders correctly if the pair is removed). Programmatic methods for necessity sanitization logic are complex. We consider two:

- **Visual diff.** The two URLs (pair inclusive and exclusive) are rendered as down-scaled bitmaps with a standardized viewport, and the Hamming distance between the images is calculated.

- **HTML tag diff.** The HTML source of the two URLs is parsed to remove visible text content. Over the remaining HTML tags, a standard textual diff is applied, and the delta size is computed.

Both methods have proven moderately effective in preliminary testing. The primary complication is the presence of dynamic content.
Such as when advertisement images change on every reload. In practice, it’s necessary to select or learn diff thresholds that can tolerate small amounts of dynamic noise and effectively represent the degree of change.

To determine pair sensitivity, we rely on techniques that build on our earlier efforts to find such keys, including:

- regular expressions gleaned from the naming patterns of known sensitive keys;
- value-driven analysis based on self-verifiability, expected formats, and known distributions; and
- mining URL corpora with metrics such as key entropy, which can indicate sensitive pairs.

We can also use human feedback loops as the basis for evaluating output correctness, as we now describe.

**CleanURL User Interface**

For prototyping purposes, we wrap our sanitization logic as a stand-alone link-shortening service. Figure 5 shows a typical session with the shortener. A user begins by entering a URL in a simple form field, which sets off the computational removal logic. For each parameter combination, the webpage source is downloaded, visually rendered, and input into our diff functions. We also investigate sensitivity properties. Ultimately, combinations are sorted from most to least privacy preserving.

This ordering is the basis by which screenshots are presented in a “shuffle” selector to the user (see Figure 5). The suggested version is selected by default as the combination that faithfully renders the page while also removing the most sensitive parameters. If a sensitive parameter can’t be removed, the user is notified.

Our design goal was to visualize the impact of URL manipulation and achieve user awareness while still maintaining a simple and usable interface. If our logic was too aggressive in removing parameters, this interface lets users correct that error. It also provides an opportunity to better understand human factors, collect ground truth, and analyze the sensitivities surrounding certain data.

Moving forward with this research, our primary goal is to complete the implementation of our CleanURL proposal. Recruiting a user base will enable usability studies and ground-truth for evaluating our “necessity” and “sensitivity” logic, which will facilitate development of a tool that can operate autonomously and transparently at high accuracy. With this, we can then survey industry partners in the URL-handling and user-generated content domains (including our data partner) about bringing this technology to bear on their platforms.

**Acknowledgments**

This article is a significant extension to the one that appeared in the Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP’14). We thank Daniel Kim and Kevin Su for their contributions on a preliminary version. ONR grant N001614WX30023 partially supported our research; this article is based on work supported by the Maryland Procurement Office under contract H98230-14-C-0127.

**References**


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