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Displaying 1-4 out of 4 total
Going Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening Communications Infrastructure
IEEE Security & Privacy
By Steven M. Bellovin,Matt Blaze,Sandy Clark,Susan Landau
Issue Date:January 2013
Mobile IP-based communications and changes in technologies, including wider use of peer-to-peer communication methods and increased deployment of encryption, has made wiretapping more difficult for law enforcement, which has been seeking to extend wiretap ...
Signaling Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
By Micah Sherr, Eric Cronin, Sandy Clark, Matt Blaze
Issue Date:November 2005
Many law enforcement wiretap systems are vulnerable to simple, unilateral countermeasures that exploit the unprotected in-band signals passed between the telephone network and the collection system. <p>This article describes the problem as well as so...
Familiarity breeds contempt: the honeymoon effect and the role of legacy code in zero-day vulnerabilities
Found in: Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '10)
By Jonathan Smith, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, Stefan Frei
Issue Date:December 2010
Work on security vulnerabilities in software has primarily focused on three points in the software life-cycle: (1) finding and removing software defects, (2) patching or hardening software after vulnerabilities have been discovered, and (3) measuring the r...
Can they hear me now?: a security analysis of law enforcement wiretaps
Found in: Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (CCS '09)
By Eric Cronin, Gaurav Shah, Matt Blaze, Micah Sherr, Sandy Clark
Issue Date:November 2009
Although modern communications services are susceptible to third-party eavesdropping via a wide range of possible techniques, law enforcement agencies in the US and other countries generally use one of two technologies when they conduct legally-authorized ...
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