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Displaying 1-4 out of 4 total
Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game
Foundations of Computer Science, Annual IEEE Symposium on
By Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel
Issue Date:October 2004
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical algorithm for the problem NASH of finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. It provides a constructive and elementary proof of existence of an equilibrium, by a typical
High-Frequency Trading: The Faster, the Better?
IEEE Intelligent Systems
By Rahul Savani
Issue Date:July 2012
The floor of the New York Stock Exchange, filled with traders in a frenzy of activity, is perhaps the iconic image of financial markets. But today, the TV pictures we see of the trading floor are largely symbolic. The frenzy of activity instead takes place...
Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries
Found in: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '13)
By John Fearnley, Martin Gairing, Paul Goldberg, Rahul Savani
Issue Date:June 2013
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to players. The aim is...
The Complexity of the Homotopy Method, Equilibrium Selection, and Lemke-Howson Solutions
Found in: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
By Christos H. Papadimitriou, Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani
Issue Date:May 2013
We show that the widely used homotopy method for solving fixpoint problems, as well as the Harsanyi-Selten equilibrium selection process for games, are PSPACE-complete to implement. Extending our result for the Harsanyi-Selten process, we show that several...
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