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Displaying 1-34 out of 34 total
Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions
Found in: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
By Ian A. Kash,Rohan Murty,David C. Parkes
Issue Date:March 2014
pp. 556-568
Wireless spectrum is a scare resource, but in practice much of it is underused by current owners. To enable better use of this spectrum, we propose an auction approach that leverages dynamic spectrum access techniques to allocate spectrum in a secondary ma...
 
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
Found in: Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Joint Conference on
By David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman
Issue Date:July 2004
pp. 261-268
Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner t...
 
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
Found in: IEEE Intelligent Systems
By Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes
Issue Date:November 2003
pp. 40-47
<p>Game theory has developed several powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems composed of multiple autonomous actors. Given this fact, AI practitioners would like to exploit these tools when building software systems containing multipl...
 
Software economies
Found in: Proceedings of the FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research (FoSER '10)
By David C. Parkes, David F. Bacon, Eric Bokelberg, Ian A. Kash, Malvika Rao, Manu Sridharan, Yiling Chen
Issue Date:November 2010
pp. 7-12
Software construction has typically drawn on engineering metaphors like building bridges or cathedrals, which emphasize architecture, specification, central planning, and determinism. Approaches to correctness have drawn on metaphors from mathematics, like...
     
Computational challenges in e-commerce
Found in: Communications of the ACM
By David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock, Joan Feigenbaum
Issue Date:January 2009
pp. 101-104
Economic and social sciences will drive Internet protocols and services into the future.
     
A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP game
Found in: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
By David C. Parkes, Shaili Jain
Issue Date:January 2013
pp. 1-35
“Games with a Purpose” are interactive games that users play because they are fun, with the added benefit that the outcome of play is useful work. The ESP game, developed byy von Ahn and Dabbish [2004], is an example of such a game devised to l...
     
Journals for certification, conferences for rapid dissemination
Found in: Communications of the ACM
By David C. Parkes, Joseph Y. Halpern, Joseph Y. Halpern
Issue Date:August 2011
pp. 36-38
Rethinking the role of journals in computer science.
     
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Found in: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '11)
By David C. Parkes, Felix Fischer, Paul Dutting
Issue Date:June 2011
pp. 341-350
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In practic...
     
A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives
Found in: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '11)
By David C. Parkes, Panagiotis Toulis
Issue Date:June 2011
pp. 323-332
In kidney exchanges, hospitals share patient lists and receive transplantations. A kidney-paired donation (KPD) mechanism needs to promote full sharing of information about donor-patient pairs, and identify a Pareto efficient outcome that also satisfies pa...
     
Complex financial products: caveat emptor: technical perspective
Found in: Communications of the ACM
By David C. Parkes
Issue Date:May 2011
pp. 100-100
In contrast to popular belief, proving termination is not always impossible.
     
Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering
Found in: Proceedings of the FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research (FoSER '10)
By David C. Parkes, Gabriel A. Moreno, Kurt Wallnau, Mark Klein
Issue Date:November 2010
pp. 195-200
Software-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society. The resulting interconnectedness and associated complexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals. Thus, contemporary software engineering is plagued b...
     
Toward automatic task design: a progress report
Found in: Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation (HCOMP '10)
By David C. Parkes, Eric Huang, Haoqi Zhang, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, Yiling Chen
Issue Date:July 2010
pp. 77-85
A central challenge in human computation is in understanding how to design task environments that effectively attract participants and coordinate the problem solving process. In this paper, we consider a common problem that requesters face on Amazon Mechan...
     
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis
Found in: Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (CCS '09)
By David C. Parkes, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei
Issue Date:November 2009
pp. 324-337
In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive for the majority of security protocols. However, an adversary can track the location of mobile nodes by monitoring pseudonyms used for authentication. A frequently proposed solution to protect loca...
     
Policy teaching through reward function learning
Found in: Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '09)
By David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen
Issue Date:July 2009
pp. 70-73
Policy teaching considers a Markov Decision Process setting in which an interested party aims to influence an agent's decisions by providing limited incentives. In this paper, we consider the specific objective of inducing a pre-specified desired policy. W...
     
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums
Found in: Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '09)
By David C. Parkes, Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen
Issue Date:July 2009
pp. 70-73
In this paper, we provide a simple game-theoretic model of an online question and answer forum. We focus on factual questions in which user responses aggregate while a question remains open. Each user has a unique piece of information and can decide when t...
     
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Found in: Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '09)
By David C. Parkes, Florin Constantin
Issue Date:July 2009
pp. 70-73
We exploit methods of sample-based stochastic optimization for the purpose of strategyproof dynamic, multi-unit auctions. There are no analytic characterizations of optimal policies for this domain and thus a heuristic approach, such as that proposed here,...
     
The role of game theory in human computation systems
Found in: Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation (HCOMP '09)
By David C. Parkes, Shaili Jain
Issue Date:June 2009
pp. 58-61
The paradigm of "human computation" seeks to harness human abilities to solve computational problems or otherwise perform distributed work that is beyond the scope of current AI technologies. One aspect of human computation has become known as "games with ...
     
Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks
Found in: Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems (NetEcon '08)
By Daniel Plakosh, David C. Parkes, Gabriel A. Moreno, Kurt Wallnau, Mark Klein, Sven Seuken
Issue Date:August 2008
pp. 107-112
We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has pri...
     
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome
Found in: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '08)
By David C. Parkes, Sebastien Lahaie
Issue Date:July 2008
pp. 703-718
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG payments. We compare this to the communication required to verify the efficient dec...
     
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values
Found in: Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS '07)
By David C. Parkes
Issue Date:May 2007
pp. N/A
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders' information. We investigate the incentive compatibility (IC) of single-item auctions for IDV ...
     
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
Found in: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet (ICEC '06)
By David C. Parkes, Laura Kang
Issue Date:August 2006
pp. 19-30
Consider an open infrastructure in which anyone can deploy mechanisms to support automated decision making and coordination amongst self-interested computational agents. Strategyproofness is a central property in the design of such mechanisms, allowing par...
     
The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution
Found in: Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '06)
By Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
Issue Date:June 2006
pp. 180-189
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a Dell E193FP LCD monitor, some bidders win auctions at prices higher than thos...
     
MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
Found in: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS '06)
By Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes
Issue Date:May 2006
pp. 1397-1404
We model social choice problems in which self interested agents with private utility functions have to agree on values for a set of variables subject to side constraints. The goal is to implement the efficient solution, maximizing the total utility across ...
     
Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions
Found in: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS '06)
By David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito
Issue Date:May 2006
pp. 1151-1158
We consider the problem of auction design with agents that have interdependent values, i.e. values that depend on each others' private signals. We adopt the contingent bids model of Dasgupta and Maskin [3], and allow agents to submit bids of the form "if p...
     
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
Found in: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '05)
By Adam Juda, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes, Hassan Sultan, Jeffrey Shneidman, Loizos Michael, Nick Elprin, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sebastien Lahaie
Issue Date:June 2005
pp. 249-258
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper bounds on their value for different t...
     
Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks
Found in: Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop: beyond the PC (EW11)
By David C. Parkes, Geoff Mainland, Laura Kang, Matt Welsh, Sebastien Lahaie
Issue Date:September 2004
pp. 1-es
This paper presents market-based macroprogramming (MBM), a new paradigm for achieving globally efficient behavior in sensor networks. Rather than programming the individual, low-level behaviors of sensor nodes, MBM defines a virtual market where nodes sell...
     
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Found in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (PODC '04)
By David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman
Issue Date:July 2004
pp. 88-97
It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will...
     
Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations
Found in: Proceedings of the conference on Electronic commerce (EC '03)
By David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman
Issue Date:June 2003
pp. 276-277
This paper introduces computation compatibility and communication compatibility as requirements for a distributed mechanism implementation. Just as payments are used to create incentive compatible mechanisms, some technique must be used to create computati...
     
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design
Found in: Proceedings of the conference on Electronic commerce (EC '03)
By David C. Parkes, Eric J. Friedman
Issue Date:June 2003
pp. 240-241
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and truthfully announce their arrival. These problems are becoming extremely common in a wide variety of problems involving wireless networking and webserv...
     
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation
Found in: Proceedings of the conference on Electronic commerce (EC '03)
By Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer
Issue Date:June 2003
pp. 238-239
We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each a...
     
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
Found in: Proceedings of the conference on Electronic commerce (EC '03)
By Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes
Issue Date:June 2003
pp. 214-215
We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-base...
     
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions
Found in: Proceedings of the conference on Electronic commerce (EC '03)
By Anshul Kothar, David C. Parke, Subhash Sur
Issue Date:June 2003
pp. 166-175
We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multi-unit allocation problem. The bidding language in our auctions allows marginal-decreasing piecewise constant curves. First, we develop a fully po...
     
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
Found in: Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents (AGENTS '01)
By David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
Issue Date:May 2001
pp. 43-50
We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of mod- ern railroads. We assume separate network territories, with an autonomous dis...
     
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Found in: Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '99)
By David C. Parkes
Issue Date:November 1999
pp. 148-157
G.E. Moore, in his book Principia Ethica, examines the popular view of ethics that deals with “what we ought to do” as well as using ethics to cover the general inquiry: “what is good?”This paper utilises Moore's view of Ethics to e...
     
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