Early Analysis of Fault-based Attack Effects in Secure Circuits October 2007 (vol. 56 no. 10) pp. 1431-1434
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2007.1078
Security often relies on functions implemented in hardware. But various types of attacks have been developed, in particular fault-based attacks allowing a hacker to observe abnormal behaviors, from which secret data can be inferred. Analyzing very early, during a circuit design, the potential impact of faults becomes therefore necessary to avoid security flaws. Dependability analysis environments have been developed to analyze the effect of "natural" faults, for example those induced by particles. This paper discusses the similarities and differences between the two types of application areas, and proposes extensions of the classical fault models to cover security-related constraints. Experimental results on a co-processor for RSA encryption demonstrate the need for such an extended fault model. [1] A.K. Lenstra, “Memo on RSA Signature Generation in the Presence of Faults,” private communication (available from the author), 28 Sept. 1996.
Index Terms:
RTL dependability evaluation, security validation, fault attacks, fault injection, fault models
Citation:
R. Leveugle, "Early Analysis of Fault-based Attack Effects in Secure Circuits," IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 56, no. 10, pp. 1431-1434, July 2007, doi:10.1109/TC.2007.1078 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||