2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06) The Final Nail in WEP?s Coffin Berkeley/Oakland, California May 21-May 24 ISBN: 0-7695-2574-1
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SP.2006.40
The 802.11 encryption standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is still widely used today despite the numerous discussions on its insecurity. In this paper, we present a novel vulnerability which allows an attacker to send arbitrary data on a WEP network after having eavesdropped a single data packet. Furthermore, we present techniques for real-time decryption of data packets, which may be used under common circumstances. Vendor produced mitigation techniques which cause frequent WEP re-keying prevent traditional attacks, whereas our attack remains effective even in such scenarios. We implemented a fully automatic version of this attack which demonstrates its practicality and feasibility in real networks. As even rapidly re-keyed networks can be quickly compromised, we believe WEP must now be abandoned rather than patched yet again.
Citation:
Andrea Bittau, Mark Handley, Joshua Lackey, "The Final Nail in WEP?s Coffin," sp, pp.386-400, 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06), 2006 Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||